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Chapter 1
Introduction
The issue of climate change and the question of whether stringent abatement policy is
to be prescribed has been one of the most challenging debates of our generation. Most
would agree that climate variability and future climate change impacts will increase the
vulnerability of societies around the world. Our recent experience has shown an increase
in the frequency as well as the severity of weather events with the recent examples
of hurricane Katrina and hurricane Sandy. The impacts will be severe especially in
developing countries but also in high risk areas in developed countries where the effect
is reinforced by the popularity of these areas, such as Florida. The economic costs of
impacts of climate change have been estimated to be several percentages of GDP if no
measures are taken either to adapt to or mitigate the effects of climate change. However,
there is an ongoing debate regarding the most cost efficient and effective climate change
policy. Despite the alarming warnings, there are many who argue for a less stringent
policy in favor of waiting for more information that will become available in the future
and that could potentially decrease the cost and increase the effectiveness of any policy.
On the other hand, they are many who emphasize the potential irreversible effects of
climate change and call for immediate intervention. In this spirit, cost benefit analysis
and Integrated Assessment Models aim to answer to the controversial question of whether
stringent abatement policy is the right prescription. However, a review of this strand
literature reveals that the conclusions and policy implications of these models are highly
dependent on the assumptions made regarding the parameters and the functional forms.
In this spirit, the first paper of this Thesis aims to cast light on this issue by
extending the model used by Pindyck [81] by allowing for different specifications for
the damage and utility functions. Using the distribution for temperature change and
the economic impact provided by Pindyck [81] which is based on information from the
IPCC (2007) and recent IAMs, I estimate a simple measure of the “willingness to pay”:
the fraction of consumption, w∗ (τ), that society would be willing to sacrifice today and
throughout the future to ensure that temperature change at some horizon H would be
1
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limited to τ . The value of w∗ (τ) will depend on the distributions of temperature change
and the economic impact as well as the utility function assumed and the values for the
ethical parameters. Pindyck, as well as most of the IAMs, uses a CRRA “multiplicative ”
functional form utility which implicitly assumes perfect substitutability between material
consumption and environmental amenities. However, as Tol et al [38] have pointed out,
the individual derives utility from environmental amenities, not necessarily translated
to market consumption. As Weitzman [101] has pointed out, the choice of an additive
rather than a multiplicative form for the utility function accounts for this fact and leads
to significantly different implications about climate change policy when consumption and
temperature change is high, with the additive form resulting to larger values for WTP.
Therefore, I employ an “additive” as well as a “multiplicative” form for the utility
function and the corresponding damage function applied to the level of consumption
rather than growth while allowing for an exponent of N = 2 and N = 3. Given the
current “ state of knowledge” Pindyck obtains estimates for the WTP which are generally
below 3% even for τ around to 2 − 3◦C. As he states, this is because there is limited
weight in the tails of the calibrated distributions for ∆T and the growth rate impact.
Instead, the specifications of the model I consider, lead to significantly higher estimations
for the WTP and in some extreme cases to a value close to 1. The results are even
stronger in the case of a larger excepted temperature change where even a quadratic
exponential loss function applied to the level of consumption gives a higher WTP than
the benchmark specification of Pindyck. Although it is hard to argue which is the
“right” functional form, the discussion is aimed to point out that a seemingly arcane
theoretical distinction between a “multiplicative” and an “additive” functional form can
have very different implications for the optimal climate change policy. Deep structural
uncertainties inherent in the climate change science require a careful treatment in order
for the analysis to lead to robust results. Moreover, a more realistic model that accounts
for parametric as well as intrinsic uncertainty in the form of exogenous shocks and risks
needs to be developed, if we are to safely answer the question of whether a stringent
abatement policy needs to be employed.
The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill of 2010 has focused considerable attention on
the potential liability and the operating conduct of big oil companies. Much less atten-
tion has been paid, however, to the nature and scope of insurance covering losses caused
by catastrophic environmental disasters such as oil spills. In the case of BP, its unusu-
ally deep pockets, guaranteed through its diversified portfolio, made full compensation
to the victims feasible. However, the real question is how to create incentives for the
parties involved in activities with potential environmental consequences, to take actions
to prevent such events. The second paper presented in this Thesis aims to answer this
question. I model a class of general equilibrium economies with uncertainty, where the
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probability of each state rather than being exogenous, depends on the level of effort
exerted by one agent and is therefore endogenously determined in equilibrium. In a
setup where “effort” is costly, I show that generically in the space of endowments, every
equilibrium is Pareto inefficient as in all economies with imperfections, an “externality”
in our case. Then, I focus on welfare improving policies and in particular on the im-
position of “participation”constraints in the financial markets. I show that generically
in the space of endowments, there is a Pareto-improving policy in the form of a real-
location of existing assets. Moreover, the results extend to economies with aggregate
uncertainty and complete markets as well as to economies with uninsurable idiosyncratic
risk. This has the important implication that complete markets need not be optimal
in an economy with probability externalities: restricting the insurance opportunities of
the agents in our model is welfare improving for the society as a whole. Since big oil
companies do not have full insurance against their potential pollution liability but are
instead “self- insured ” by being sufficiently diversified in their portfolio investments,
the above analysis suggests that a less diversified portfolio could make the society as a
whole better off.
The role of public policy in environmental problems is a hotly debated issue among
economists and non economists alike. The only consensus seems to be that if there is
to be public intervention it has to come as an incentive-based instrument rather than
command and control. The early “Pigouvian” literature on externalities and corrective
taxes has argued that it would be sufficient to levy a tax on an externality generating
activity equal to its social marginal damage. However, Pigou taxes would be sufficient
to achieve Pareto optimality only in a first best environment. In a second best set-
ting, where there are other distortionary taxes in the system, this prescription must be
modified. The problem was originally studied by Sandmo [88] and more recently by
Bovenberg and Van der Ploeg [12]. What they have shown is what Sandmo called the
“additivity property” where the presence of externality only changes the tax formula for
the externality generating good but leaves the optimal income and commodity taxes un-
affected. Bovenberg and Van der Ploeg [13] and Bovenberg and de Mooiz [12] conclude
that “in the presence of pre-existing distortionary taxes, the optimal pollution tax typi-
cally lies below the Pigouvian tax...”. In other words, while the first best rule calls for a
tax that is only corrective, the second best tax embodies both corrective and optimal tax
objectives, a tax structure which may be described as “Ramsey plus Pigou”. Following
the above literature, Cremer, Gahvari and Ladoux [24] and Cremer, Gahvari and Ladoux
[25] allow for more than one polluting goods and for non linear taxation casting light on
the importance and the relevance of the separability restrictions on preferences required
for the above result and concluding that the optimal environmental levy amy exceed,
fall short of, or be equal to the Pigouvian tax depending on the assumptions made.
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Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [40] show that, generically in the space of exchange
economies with linear, separable consumption externalities, competitive equilibria are
constrained inefficient in the sense that there exists a policy intervention, in the form of
anonymous taxes on the purchases of commodities, and anonymous, uniform transfers of
revenue, which are balanced from a fiscal point of view and induce welfare improvements
for all agents in the economy.
The purpose of the third paper presented in this Thesis is to apply the results of
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [40] to the more stylized framework used in environ-
mental economics, in order to bring to the attention of environmental economists the
more recent developments on market failure theory. This will require us to extend the
original results to production economies, while adding much generality to the framework
used, for instance, by Sandmo. Importantly, we will also study the case of externalities
in an OLG with heterogeneous agents, setting, extending and applying the results of
Carvajal and Polemarchakis [16]. We present a benchmark model of an infinite-horizon
production economy where production activities generate pollution. After solving for
the competitive equilibrium, we show that as in all economies with externalities, the
equilibrium is Pareto inefficient. We then focus on the design of the optimal fiscal pol-
icy for the implementation of the first-best. We find that a mix of tax on capital and
labor, combined with a subsidy on afforestation and lump-sum transfers implement the
first-best allocation. The next step is to extend this model to allow for heterogeneous
agents and an OLG setup. In such a framework, the lack of information makes the
decentralization of the first best infeasible, an argument which has been often used by
supporters of no intervention. However, the real question one should ask is whether there
are any Pareto improving policies at all. The focus is then on proving the constrained
inefficiency of the competitive equilibrium which is to say that although the first best
allocation cannot be achieved, a carefully designed environmental policy can still make
everybody better off.
The final chapter of this Thesis has a focus on behavioral economics and environ-
mental externalities. In particular, I focus on agents endowed with “temptation and
self-control” preferences, as described first by Gul and Pesendorfer [46]. They build a
2-period decision problem where in the first period agents choose over menus of lotteries
and in the second period they choose an alternative from the chosen menu. How-
ever, agents are subject to temptation: at the time of actual consumption, they suffer
from urges to deviate from their “commitment” preferences which prescribes what they
“should” do and instead evaluate alternatives according to their “temptation” prefer-
ences which is what they “want” to do. Importantly, even if they resist temptation,
they will suffer from a self-control cost. In this chapter, I am extending this model to
an economy with environmental externalities and in particular environmental pollution
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as a byproduct of consumption. I analyze a two- period, two-countries model where
in the first period countries, represented by their decision makers, negotiate over the
upper(and potentially lower) bounds of consumption and therefore over the associated
level of pollution. In the second period, the consumers choose a level of consumption
within the allowed range. In this context and with agents experiencing different types
of temptations or random temptation, I find that it is optimal for a decision maker to
commit to a singleton set avoiding in this way temptation and the cost of self-control.
Allowing for shocks in the economy creates a trade-off between commitment and flexibil-
ity to adjust to shocks. In this case, the optimal policy for a decision maker will depend
on the range of parameters. I find that for a relatively small shock, full commitment is
favored at the expense of no adjustment to shocks. Instead, for a relatively big shock,
uncertainty becomes too important to ignore and some degree of flexibility is optimal
at the expense of a self-control cost. Further research will focus on the design of Pareto
improving policies in this context and on extending the model to allow for strategic
interactions between the countries.
Chapter 2
Uncertainty, Extreme Outcomes and Climate
Change: a critique
2.1 Introduction
The issue of increasing greenhouse gas emissions and the potential impacts on welfare
has been the subject of a growing literature which aims to join climate to economy,
predict future temperature change and offer an insight regarding the optimal climate
change policy: when, where and by how much to abate emissions. Most economic
analyses of climate change policy have five elements: projections of CO2e under a “
business usual’, projections of the average temperature change likely to result from
higher CO2e concentrations, projections of lost GDP and consumption resulting from
higher temperatures, estimates of abatement cost of GHG emissions and assumptions
about social utility and other ethical parameters. This is essentially the approach of
Nordhaus [71], Stern [91], Hope [54] and others that evaluate abatement policies using
“Integrated Assessment Models” (IAMs). Surprisingly, some of these models conclude -
in direct contradiction of the urgency expressed in the scientific literature- that stringent
abatement is both economically unsound and unnecessary.
The scope of this paper is to show how the deep structural uncertainties inherent in
climate change economics can lead to very different implications for the optimal climate
change policy. In Pindyck [81], the author concludes, that “ given the current state of
knowledge regarding warming and its impact, my results do not support the immediate
adoption of stringent abatement policy.” My analysis builds up on his work and aims
to show how different assumptions about the utility function, the damage function and
the distributions of the unknown parameters can support the immediate adoption of an
abatement policy. Following Pindyck, I estimate a simple measure of the “willingness to
pay”: the fraction of consumption, w∗ (τ) that society would be willing to sacrifice today
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and throughout the future to ensure that temperature change at some horizon H would
be limited to τ . The value of w∗ (τ) will depend on the distributions of temperature
change and the economic impact as well as the utility function assumed and the values
for the ethical parameters. It should be noted here that I am not considering whether
the fraction of concumption sacrificed is enough to keep temperature change below τ
but instead I focus entirely on how the inherent uncertainties about temperature change
and economic impact would affect the WTP.
I use the distribution for temperature change and the economic impact provided by
Pindyck [81] which is based on information from the IPCC (2007) and recent IAMs. As
Weitzman [101] has shown, WTP becomes infinite if one uses a fat tailed distribution,
therefore I follow Pindyck in using a thin tailed distribution for temperature change
and economic impact. Unlike existing IAMs , he also assumes that temperature change
affects the growth rate of GDP and consumption rather than the level. Although justified
on theoritical and empirical grounds as Dell and Jones [30] have shown, I argue that the
way he translates the economic impact in levels to one in growth is not so “innocent”
and could be a source of the low WTP that he finds.
Pindyck uses a quadratic exponential loss function to relate temperature change and
GDP. The choice of an exponential rather an inverse quadratic polynomial loss function
(as the DICE damage function) allows for greater losses when ∆T is large. However,
as have pointed out, there is no empirical evidence regarding the shape of the damage
function, even at historical temperatures-let alone “out of the sample” forecasting of
damages at temperatures beyond the historical range, which is what really matters in
the context of uncertainty and extreme outcomes. In other words, there is no obvious
source of support for the crucial assumption that the exponent is equal to 2. They use
the well-established DICE damage function and study the effects of ∆T = 19◦C on the
level of GDP for increasing values of the exponent N . They show that with N = 2,
less than half of world output is lost although this temperature change is far beyond the
temperature change needed to end human life as we know it. In contrast, as N rises, half
of the world output is lost at ∆T = 7◦C forN = 3 and at ∆T = 4.5◦C for N = 4. As N
approaches infinity, the damage function approaches a vertical line, which makes sense
if one accepts that there is a threshold for an abrupt word ending (or at least economy
ending) discontinuity. As I want to study the effects of extreme climate change, I will
adopt the above approach and set N = 3.
The final matter of concern is the choice of the utility function of the individual.
Pindyck, as well as most of the IAMs, uses a CRRA “multiplicative ” functional form
utility which implicitly assumes perfect substitutability between material consumption
and environmental amenities. However, as Tol et al [38] have pointed out, the individual
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derives utility from environmental amenities, not necessarily translated to market con-
sumption. As Weitzman [101] has pointed out, the choice of an additive rather than a
multiplicative form for the utility function accounts for this fact and leads to significantly
different implications about climate change policy when consumption and temperature
change is high, with the additive form resulting to larger values for WTP.
Therefore, I employ an “additive” as well as a “multiplicative” form for the utility
function and the corresponding damage function applied to the level of consumption
rather than growth while allowing for an exponent of N = 2 and N = 3. The first
immediate results are higher levels of damages for large temperature change that could
represent extreme climate change. These results are along the same lines with the results
of Ackerman [1] and Weitzman [101] who emphasize the importance of uncertainty
regarding the shape of the damage function and the climate sensitivity parameter for the
inclusion of potential catastrophes in IAMs and the justification of an immediate and
stringent abatement policy. Given the current “ state of knowledge” Pindyck obtains
estimates for the WTP which are generally below 3% even for τ around to 2−3◦C. As he
states, this is because there is limited weight in the tails of the calibrated distributions for
∆T and the growth rate impact. Instead, the specifications of the model I consider, lead
to significantly higher estimations for the WTP and in some extreme cases to a value close
to 1. The results are even stronger in the case of a larger excepted temperature change
where even a quadratic exponential loss function applied to the level of consumption
gives a higher WTP than the benchmark specification of Pindyck. Although Dell, Jones
and Olken [30] have shown that higher temperatures reduce GDP growth rates rather
than levels, the previous results cast doubts as to whether the specification of the model
where temperature change affects the growth rather than the level of consumption brings
robust estimates for the WTP. However, as it is hard to argue which is the “right”
functional form, the discussion is aimed to point out that a seemingly arcane theoretical
distinction between a “multiplicative” and an “additive” functional form can have very
different implications for the optimal climate change policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is dedicated to the method-
ology followed regarding the treatment of temperature change and its distribution, and
the functional forms for the damage and utility functions . In Section 3, I describe
the methodology followed for the estimation of WTP as well as the differences in the
estimations resulting from the different specifications of the model. Section 4 concludes
with the policy implications of my analysis.
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2.2 Background and Methodology
Most economic analyses of climate change policy have five elements: projections of
CO2e under a “ business usual”, projections of the average temperature change likely
to result from higher CO2e concentrations, projections of lost GDP and consumption
resulting from higher temperatures, estimates of abatement cost of GHG emissions and
assumptions about social utility and other ethical parameters. In this section, I offer a
descriptive analysis of the above. As Pindyck is the benchmark model for my analysis,
there is an analytical description of his methodology regarding temperature change and
economic impart as well as the possible issues that can arise.
2.2.1 Temperature Change
Following Pindyck [81], I use the estimates of the IPCC (2007a) for “climate sensitivity”:
the temperature change that would result from an anthropomorphic doubling of CO2e
concentration. Climate sensitivity is then used as a proxy of temperature change a
century from now, given the IPCC’s consensus prediction of a doubling (relative to the
preindustrial level) of CO2e concentration by the end of the century. According to the
22 studies that the IPCC surveyed, it is found that temperature change has an expected
value of 2.5◦ to 3.0◦C. I use the estimates of Pindyck [81] that with 17% probability,
a doubling of CO2e would lead to a mean temperature increase of 4.5◦C or more, with
5% probability to a temperature increase of 7.0 or more and with 1% probability to a
temperature increase of 10.0◦C or more. The 1% and 5% tails of the distribution for
∆T clearly represent extreme outcomes as temperature changes of such a magnitude are
outside the range human experience.
I assume that temperature change follows a displaced gamma distribution and I fit
it to the above summary numbers. Let θ be the displacement parameter, the distribution
is given by :
f(x; r, λ, θ) =
λr
Γ(r)
(x− θ)r−1e−λ(x−θ), x ≥ θ (2.1)
F (x; r, λ, θ) = 1− Γ(r, (x− θ)λ)
Γ(r)
(2.2)
where
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Γ (r) =
∫ ∞
0
sr−1e−sds (2.3)
is the Gamma function, r is the shape parameter and λ the inverse scale parameter.
The moment generating function for this distribution is:
Mx(t) = E
(
etx
)
=
(
λ
λ− t
)r
etθ (2.4)
Hence, the mean, the variance and the skewness (around the mean) are given by
E (x) = rλ + θ, V (x) =
r
λ2
and S (x) = 2r
λ3
respectively.
The next step is to fit f(x; r, λ, θ) to a mean of 3.0◦C and the 1% and 5% points at
7.0◦ and 10.0◦C respectively yields r = 3.8, λ = 0.92 and θ = −1.13, with V = 4.49 and
S = 9.76. Note that this distribution implies that there is a small probability of 2.9%
that a doubling of CO2e concentration will lead to a reduction in temperature change
which is consistent with several of the scientific studies. These are the estimates given
by Pindyck [81]. As in Pindyck, I assume that the fitted distribution for T applies to
a 100-year horizon H and that ∆Tt → 2∆TH as t gets large. This implies that the
trajectory for temperature change is given by
∆Tt = 2∆TH(1− 0.5 tH ) (2.5)
Therefore, if ∆TH = 5
◦C ,∆T reaches 2.93◦C after 50 years, 5◦C after 100 years and
then gradually approaches 10◦C as t gets large.
2.2.2 Economic Impact and Choice of Functional Forms
It has become common in the literature to assume that temperature change and GDP
are associated through a loss function L (∆Tt) , with L (0) = 1 and L
′
< 0 so that GDP
at some horizon H is L (∆TH)GDPH , where GDPH is GDP in the absence of global
warming. Many of the IAMs use a simple power law or an inverse quadratic loss function
as in the DICE model of Nordhaus [71] while Weitzman [102] argues for an exponential
loss function which allows for greater losses when temperature change is large. On
the other hand, there are reasons to believe that temperature change would affect the
growth rate of GDP rather than just the level. One could think of irreversible and
permanent effects of climate change as for example the destruction of ecosystems from
erosion and flooding, extinction of species and deaths from health effects and weather
extremes. Second, climate change leads to a reduction of resources available for R&D
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and capital investment and therefore reduces growth as it has a negative impact on the
level of GDP and also because of the resources that need to be allocated to counter the
floods, droughts, sickness, etc resulting from higher temperatures. Third, there is the
effect of climate change on savings. As Frankhauser et al. [38] point out, in a world with
perfect foresight we can expect forward- looking agents to change their savings behavior
in anticipation of future climate change. This, too, will affect the accumulation of capital
and hence growth and future GDP. Finally, there is also empirical support for a growth
rate effect. Dell, Jones and Olken [30] have shown that higher temperatures reduce
GDP growth rates rather than levels. The impact they estimate is large-a decrease of
1.1 percentage point of growth for each 1◦C but significant only for poorer countries. In
the benchmark model of my analysis, Pindyck assumes that in the absence of warming,
real GDP and consumption would grow at a constant rate g0 but warming will reduce
this rate :
gt = g0 − γ∆Tt (2.6)
This simple linear relationship was estimated by Dell, Jones and Olken (2008), fits
the data well and can be viewed as at least a first approximation to a more complex func-
tion. Assuming that the loss function applied to the levels has the following functional
form
L(∆Tt) = e
−β(∆Tt)2 (2.7)
Pindyck uses information from a number of IAMs to obtain a distribution for β and then
translate this into a distribution for γ. To do this translation, he uses the trajectory
for GDP and consumption implied by equation (2.5) for a temperature change-impact
combination projected to occur at horizon H, so that the growth rate is given by
gt = g0 − γ2∆TH(1− 0.5t/H) (2.8)
Normalizing initial consumption at 1, consumption at any time t is given by the following
expression
Ct = e
∫ t
0 g(s)ds (2.9)
By substituting for the growth rate according to (2.8) and solving for the integral, (2.9)
becomes
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Ct = e
∫ t
0 g(s)ds = e(g0−2γ∆TH)t−
2γH∆TH
ln 0.5
(1−0.5t/H) (2.10)
Noting that consumption at any time t should be the same whether I assume that
temperature change affects the levels or the growth rate of GDP/consumption, γ can be
obtained by equating the expressions of CH implied by (2.7) and (2.8):
eg0H−β(∆T )
2
= e(g0−2γ∆TH)H−
2γH∆TH
ln 0.5
0.5 (2.11)
so that
γ = 1.79β∆TH/H (2.12)
The next step is to estimate β and hence γ. Although there is no knowledge
regarding the impact of extreme temperature change in the range of 7◦C or above, there
is a consensus regarding the most likely range of economic impacts corresponding to the
most likely range of temperature change. Based on its own survey of impact estimates
from four IAMs, the IPCC(2007b) concludes that global mean losses could be 1-5%
fo GDP for 4.0C of warming.1 In addition, Dietz and Stern [32] provide a graphical
summary of damage estimates from several IAMs, which yield a range of 0.5% to 2%
of lost GDP for ∆T = 3.0◦C and 1% to 8% of lost GDP for ∆T = 5.0◦C. Using the
IPCC range and assuming that it applies to a 66% confidence interval, I take the mean
loss for ∆T = 4.0◦C to be 3% of GDP and the 17% and 83% confidence points to be
1% and 5% of GDP respectively. From these 3 numbers, using the exponential loss
function we can find the mean, the 17% and 83% values for β which are β¯ = 0.0019037,
β1 = 0.000628 and β2 = 0.0032 respectively. Pidyck translates these values of β to values
of γ through (2.12) and gets γ¯ = 0.0001367, γ1 = 0.000045 and γ2 = 0.00023. Assuming
that the distributions of ∆T and γ are independent given that they are governed by
completely different physical economic/processes, he then fits a 3- parameter displaced
gamma distribution for γ using the above numbers and he gets rγ = 4.5 , λγ = 21.341
and θγ = −0.0000746.
A closer look to the assumptions and methods followed above reveals some non-
trivial weaknesses that ought to be discussed. The first issue is the choice of the damage
function. As noted in the introduction, there is no obvious source of support for the cru-
cial assumption of an exponential quadratic loss function as presented in (2.7). where the
exponent N is set equal to 2.2 As Ackerman et al. [1] have pointed out, the exponent N
1The IAMs surveyed by he IPCC include Hope [53], Mendelsohn et at [64], Nordhaus and Boyer [74]
and Tol [96].
2For an exponential loss function, L(∆Tt) = e
−β(∆Tt)N , the exponent N measures the speed with
which damages increase as temperature rises.
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measures the speed with with which damages increase as temperature rises. Choosing a
larger (“closer to infinity”) N means moving closer to the view that complete catastrophe
sets in at some finite temperature threshold. Choosing a smaller N means emphasizing
the gradual rise of damages rather than the risk of discontinuous catastrophic change.
As I am interested in the effects of uncertainty and extreme outcomes on the willingness
to pay, I am going to use N = 3 as a specification of my model and compare it to the
benchmark model with N = 2. The first obvious effect of using a larger value for N is
the increase in the loss of GDP for high temperatures. For example, for N = 3 and an
exponential loss function, I get β¯ = 0.0006345 and so for ∆T = 10◦C (which is outside
the range of human experience), almost half of the world output would be destroyed
while N = 2 would lead to a destruction of only around 20% of world output. However,
the difference is trivial for small temperature changes so for example for ∆T = 3.0◦C,
the loss is 1.7% and 1.69% of GDP for N = 2 and N = 3 respectively.
Even if one chooses an exponent high enough to accommodate for the losses of ex-
treme temperature change, there is an even more important source of inefficiency in the
estimation of the economic impact of climate change on welfare: the functional form of
the loss function, whether “multiplicative” or “additive”, will have very different impli-
cations for the magnitude of the impact of temperature change. It has become common
in the literature of climate change and IAM’s to assume a multiplicative functional form
for the loss function either with rational bounding or with exponential bounding given
by
LMR(∆Tt) =
1
1 + aM∆T 2t
(2.13)
and
LME(∆Tt) = e
−β(∆Tt)2 (2.14)
respectively where the latter form gives larger losses for high temperature change.3 Then,
a CRRA utility function corresponding to the first multiplicative damage function is of
the form
UMR(c
∗
t ,∆Tt) =
c
∗(1−η)
t (1 + aM∆T
2
t )
η−1
1− η (2.15)
and for the second
3At it will be shown later, WTP is higher in the case of multiplicative damage function with expo-
nential bounding than with rational bounding.
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UME(c
∗
t ,∆Tt) =
c
∗(1−η)
t e
−β∆T 2t (1−η)
1− η (2.16)
where c∗t is consumption in the absence of temperature change and η is the index of
relative risk aversion.4
The above functional form assumes that there is strong substitutability between its
two attributes, consumption and temperature change. It best fits situations where the
main economic impact of temperature change is in material consumption or consumption
of market goods. However, as Fankhauser and Tol [38] have pointed out, the individ-
ual can derive utility from non market goods, as for example environmental amenities.
This idea is embodied in what is so called an “existence” value for environment. Hence,
climate change which, in the model considered, is represented by a temperature change,
has market impacts which go through the increase of production cost and affect the
growth rate of the economy, but also non-market impacts such as the effect on recre-
ational and environmental assets, health and biodiversity. In this account,Weitzman
[102] shows that using a “additive” rather than a “multiplicative” functional form for
the loss function and the corresponding utility function takes into account non-market
impacts of climate change. He suggests the following “additive” loss function
and the implied “additive” utility function
LA(∆Tt) =
1
1 + aAc∗t∆T 2t
(2.17)
UA(c
∗
t ,∆Tt) =
c
∗(1−η)
t (1 + aAc
∗
t∆T
2
t )
η−1
1− η (2.18)
where it is implicitly assumed that there is no substitutability between market and
non-market goods and consumption. Although it is hard to argue which is the “right”
functional form, the discussion is aimed to point out that a seemingly arcane theoretical
distinction between a “multiplicative” and an “additive” functional form can have very
different implications for the optimal climate change policy. It will be shown later that,
especially for high temperature change, willingness to pay to avoid climate change is
much higher under an “additive” utility function.
The same discussion applies for the choice of function that relates growth to tem-
perature change. Pindyck assumes a simple linear functional form, the same that Dell
4It should be noted that U(c∗t ,∆Tt) represents U only as a reduced form in c
∗
t and ∆Tt. The
indirect pathway via which temperature change affects welfare is through reducing actual consumption
as represented by the loss function ct = L(∆Tt)c
∗
t so that V (L(∆Tt)c
∗
t ) = U(c
∗
t ,∆Tt)
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and Jones use in their analysis. Although it is a good approximation of a possibly more
complicated relationship and fits the data well, it does not account for the effects of large
temperature change. First, Pindyck argues that he uses an exponential loss function in
order to allow for larger losses for high temperature change in the levels of consumption,
which he then translates into an effect on the growth level. However, the choice of the
loss function is irrelevant for the estimation of γ: only the estimated loss from a range of
likely temperature change scenarios is needed for the estimation of the effect on growth.
Therefore, the choice of the growth function becomes even more important as it will
determine the magnitude of the impact of high temperature change and extreme events.
To make this point clear, assume that g0 = 0.02 , ¯γ = 0.0001367, and ∆TH = 20.0C
◦.
Equation (2.8) then implies a decrease of 0.0003 in the growth rate which is tiny for
a temperature change which is well beyond the temperature needed to cause the end
of human life as we know it. It comes as no surprise then that the benchmark model
concludes that even if people face the risk of an extreme climate change event that would
end human life as we know it, willingness to pay for abatement technology would still
be very low.
2.3 Willigness to Pay
The preferences of an agent are described by a CRRA utility function:
V (ct) =
c1−ηt
1− η (2.19)
where η is the index of relative risk aversion. As discussed earlier, U(c∗t ,∆Tt) represents
utility as a reduced form in c∗ and ∆T so that
V (L(∆Tt)c
∗
t ) = U(c
∗
t ,∆Tt)
Time is continuous and we normalize population to be constant at N=1. Then, social
welfare is:
W = E0
∫ ∞
0
U(c∗t ,∆Tt) e
−δtdt (2.20)
where δ is the pure time preference rate and E0 denotes the expectation at t = 0 over
the distribution of the unknown parameters.5 I assume that there is just one individual
5As discussed earlier, I have assumed a displaced gamma distribution for temperature change and
for the parameter γ.
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at each point in time (or a group of identical individuals). Alternatively, one could
think of the problem as one of a representative consumer that lives for infinite time.
That is to say that the lifetime well-being of a person is constructed in the same way
as intergenerational well-being is constructed, which means that even if a person lives
for many periods, she is considered to be a distinct self at each point in time. However,
one could argue here that the decision about how much an individual would save for his
children involves quite different ethics than the ones involved in the decision about how
one should spread his consumption across time.
In the benchmark model with a linear function describing the effect of temperature
change on growth, social welfare is given by:
W =
1
1− ηE0
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt+ω(1−0.5
t/H)dt (2.21)
where ρ = (η − 1)(g0 − 2γ∆TH) + δ and ω = 2(η−1)γ∆THln(0.5)
In order to study the implications of different functional forms for the loss and utility
functions, I consider three different specifications for my model: a multiplicative damage
function with exponential bounding, one with rational and an additive one. Taking into
account the relevant functional forms for utility as given in (2.15), (2.16),(2.18) and
noting that consumption in the absence of temperature change at time t is given by
c∗t = eg0t, social welfare is given by
WME =
1
1− ηE0
∫ ∞
0
e−δt−(η−1)(g0t−4β∆T
2
H(1−0.5t/H)2)dt (2.22)
WMR =
1
1− ηE0
∫ ∞
0
e−δt−g0(η−1)t(1 + 4αM∆T 2H(1− 0.5t/H)2)η−1dt (2.23)
WA =
1
1− ηE0
∫ ∞
0
e−δt−g0(η−1)t(1 + 4eg0tαA∆T 2H(1− 0.5t/H)2)η−1dt (2.24)
respectively.
In these three specifications, temperature change does not the enter the growth
function of consumption. Instead, temperature change and consumption are associated
through a loss function L (∆Tt) , with L (0) = 1 and L
′
< 0 so that consumption at some
horizon H is L (∆TH) c
∗
H , where c
∗
H is consumption in the absence of global warming.
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Note, that in order to avoid integrals that blow up, WTP must be based on some finite
horizon, which I set to be N=500 years.
Suppose society sacrifices a fraction w (τ) of present and future consumption to
ensure that any increase in temperature at a specific horizon H, is limited to an amount
τ . This fraction is the measure of the willingness to pay. In this case, social welfare at
t = 0 would be :
W˜ (τ) =
[1− w (τ)]1−η
1− η E0,τ
∫ ∞
0
e−ρ˜t+ω˜(1−0.5
t/H)dt (2.25)
W˜ME(τ) =
[1− w (τ)]1−η
1− η E0,τ
∫ ∞
0
e−δt−(η−1)(g0t−4β∆T
2
H(1−0.5t/H)2)dt (2.26)
W˜MR(τ) =
[1− w (τ)]1−η
1− η E0,τ
∫ ∞
0
e−δt−g0(η−1)t(1 + 4αM∆T 2H(1− 0.5t/H)2)η−1dt
(2.27)
W˜A(τ) =
[1− w (τ)]1−η
1− η E0,τ
∫ ∞
0
e−δt−g0(η−1)t(1 + 4eg0tαA∆T 2H(1− 0.5t/H)2)η−1dt
(2.28)
where E0,τ denotes the expectation at t = 0 over the distributions of ∆TH and γ condi-
tional on ∆TH ≤ τ .6 (I use ω˜ and ρ˜ to denote that they are both functions of random
variables.) If on the other hand, no action is taken to limit warming, ∆TH is uncon-
strained and social welfare is given by (2.21), (2.22), (2.23) and (2.24), Willingness to
pay to ensure that ∆TH ≤ τ is the value w∗(τ) that equates W˜ (τ) and W , social wel-
fare without any action taken, for all the specifications of the model. By constraining
∆TH to be under some threshold τ , damages from temperature change will also be con-
strained and a lower bound for consumption will be guaranteed. If no action is taken,
the distribution temperature change is unconstrained and so are the damages and lost
consumption. WTP is the fraction of consumption you could sacrifice today and in the
future that makes you exactly indifferent between taking and not taking any action.
Given the distributions f (∆T ) and h (γ) for ∆T and γ respectively, denote by
Mτ (t), M∞ (t) the constrained and unconstrained time- t expectations for the bench-
mark model:
6Note that I have assumed a displaced gamma distribution for temperature change and the parameter
γ as given in (2.12).
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Mτ (t) =
1
F (τ)
∫ τ
θτ
∫ ∞
θγ
e−ρ˜t+ω˜(1−0.5
t/H)f(∆T )g(γ)d∆Tdγ (2.29)
M∞ (t) =
∫ ∞
θτ
∫ ∞
θγ
e−ρ˜t+ω˜(1−0.5
t/H)f (∆T ) g (γ) d∆Tdγ (2.30)
where θτ and θγ are lower limits on the distribution for ∆T and γ and F (τ) =
∫ τ
θτ
f (∆T ) d∆T .
The constrained expectation refers to the case when action is taken to limit temperature
change and the unconstrained when no such action is taken. Therefore, social welfare
in the case of action and no action taken, as given in (2.21) and (2.25), becomes
W˜ (τ) =
[1− w (τ)]1−η
1− η
∫ N
0
Mτ (t) dt =
[1− w (τ)]1−η
1− η Gτ (2.31)
W =
1
1− η
∫ N
0
M∞ (t) dt =
1
1− ηG∞ (2.32)
where Gτ =
∫ N
0 Mτ (t) dt and G∞ =
∫ N
0 M∞ (t) dt
FInally, setting W˜ (τ) equal to W , WTP is given by :
w∗ (τ) = 1− [G∞/Gτ ]1/1−η (2.33)
Following the same method, I can find the WTP for the three specifications of my
model, namely w˜∗ME(τ), w˜
∗
MR(τ) and w˜
∗
A(τ).
2.3.1 Parameter Values
Finally, one should discuss the values assumed for the “ethical” parameters, namely the
rate of time preference (or the utility discount rate) δ and the consumption discount
rate R. A good starting point is the so-called Ramsey rule
Rt = δ + ηgt (2.34)
where η is the index of relative risk aversion and gt is the growth rate of consumption.
The first component of, δ, implies discounting of future utility while the second implies
discounting the value of future consumption simply because we will be richer in the
future and the rich gain less welfare than the poor for a given quantity of money.
Chapter 2 Uncertainty, Extreme Outcome and Climate Change: a critique 19
There are two approaches for the choice of the consumption discount rate. The
prescriptive approach sets δ and η based on ethical views and then calculates R according
to the Ramsey rule. In contrast, the descriptive approach sets R based on descriptions
of the financial market interest rates and then calculates δ and η. Descriptivists are
often flexible on the specific values of δ and η as long as they combine to give the desired
level of R. As Dasgupta argues, descriptivism “is an interesting democratic work in
that the values are generated by people’s behavior as they go out in their daily lives.
However, one should think here who are these people whose behavior we observe ”. The
market interest rates describe the behavior of current individuals only. One could ask
the question why the interest of future generations should be determined by consulting
the preferences of present generation (Baum, [8]), an approach which is often called
“dictatorship of the present”. Given that the decisions of the present generation will
have a long run impact that will affect the welfare of the future generations, excluding
future humans is violating the basic principle that those who are affected by a decision
should have input in the decision-making process. One should also note here that, due
to externalities and the absence of a market for environmental amenities, the social
discount rate could be substantially different from the private rate of return. Finally,
one should take into account the existence of multiple market rates so that analysts
cannot consider any single market rate to describe how society discounts.
Hence, I stick with the prescriptive approach and I set δ = 0 on the grounds that
even though most people would value a benefit today more highly than a year from
now, there is no reason why society should impose those preferences on the wellbeing of
our grandchildren. Cline [23] also sets δ = 0 while Stern sets δ = 0.01 to account for
the probability of extinction. However, they both find that stringent abatement policy
is necessary. In contrast, Nordhaus [71] sets δ = 0.03 and concludes that aggressive
abatement is not optimal. Pindyck also assumes δ = 0 and the consumption discount
rate is given by
Rt = δ + ηgt = δ + ηg0 − 2ηγ∆TH(1− 0.5 tH ) (2.35)
Note that in this specification, R is endogenous: it depends on the growth rate of
consumption gt which is function of temperature change ∆Tt.
As for the index of relative risk aversion, I set η = 2, which is to say that individuals
are very risk averse towards inequalities in income among generations (or in different
periods of their lifetime). Based upon empirical evidence, g0 is in the range of 0.02−0.25.
In my estimations, I will set g0 = 0.015− 0.025.
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2.3.2 No uncertainty
If the trajectory for ∆T and the impact of that trajectory on economic growth and in
the loss functions were all known with certainty, social welfare with and without action
would simply be:
W1 =
[1− w (τ)]1−η
1− η
∫ N
0
e−ρτ t+ωτ (1−0.5
t/H)dt (2.36)
W2 =
1
1− η
∫ N
0
e−ρ0t−ωt
2
dt (2.37)
where ρτ = (η − 1)(g0 − 2γτ) + δ and ωτ = 2(η−1)γτln(0.5) . By setting ∆TH = τ , I find social
welfare under no uncertainly for all the specifications of my model.
I start by calculating the WTP to keep ∆T = 0◦C for all time, i.e. w∗(0), over a
range of values for ∆T at a horizon of 100 years. Here, I am using the mean γ¯ as the
certainty equivalent value of γ and I set N=500, η = 2, δ = 0, and g0 = 0.015, 0.02, 0.025
7. The results for the different specifications of the model and different combinations of
the parameters are shown in Table 2.1. For example, in the benchmark specification, for
∆TH = 6
◦C and g0 = 0.02, w(0)∗ = 0.022 which means that society would be willing to
sacrifice about 2.2% of current and future consumption to keep temperature change at
0◦C instead of 6◦C.
The first thing to notice is that the additive specification gives a value of WTP
much higher than every other specification: even for small expected temperature change,
such as ∆T = 2◦C, WTP is in the range of 8%-14%, a range much higher than the
one implied by the Pindyck model and by the alternative multiplicative specifications.
Therefore, it appears that whether we assume that market goods and non-market goods
are substitutable or not, has a determining effect on the optimal climate change policy.
One could argue that, climate change impacts of a specific nature such as health and
biodiversity qualify as non-market goods which cannot be readily translated to material
consumption. In that case, perhaps an additive utility function is more appropriate from
a theoretical perspective while accounting for the severity of large temperature changes
and the urgency of action that the environmental scientists seem to prescribe.
A few more points worth to be noted. First, an exponent of 3 or larger in the
damage function, increases WTP significantly for every specification, especially for larger
changes in temperature. This result comes as no surprise: allowing for a larger exponent
7Similarly, I use the mean value of β, αA and αM for the other specifications of my model.
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emphasizes the effects of extreme climate change on consumption and consequently on
the willingness to pay. Comparing the case of growth effect of temperature with the one
on the levels, WTP is similar for small temperature change but becomes much higher
in the latter specification for larger temperature change. One should also note that
the larger the expected temperature change is, the higher is the WTP. In contrast, the
higher is τ , the upper bound on temperature change, the lower is the WTP. Society is
more willing to pay when they are expecting worst outcomes to come and less willing,
the less effective the environmental policy is. Finally, in all the specifications except
from the additive, WTP increases as the initial growth rate decreases. The reason is
that lowering g0 lowers the entire trajectory for the consumption discount rate. This
rate falls as ∆T increases but its starting value is δ+ ηg0 . The damages from warming
are initially small, making estimates of WTP highly dependent on the values for δ, η,
and g0 .
2.3.3 Uncertainty Limited to Temperature Change
The discussion above also applies to models with uncertainty. As an illustrative example,
I will examine the case where there is uncertainty only with regards to temperature
change: the results extent to economies with uncertainty over the economic impact too.
Therefore, I assume that there is uncertainty over the trajectory of ∆T as represented by
its cumulative distribution while the loss function is deterministic, with the parameters
fixed at their mean values. I focus on the benchmark specification of Pindyck and the
one with the additive loss function which allows for higher WTP. Table 2.2 shows w∗ (τ)
for several values of τ , setting η = 2, δ = 0 and g0 = 0.015 − 0.025. The first thing
to observe is that in the benchmark specification, WTP is always below or just around
2% even for small values of τ . The values become even smaller as initial growth rate
increases as the consumption discount rate becomes bigger. In contrast, in the additive
specification WTP is in the range of 10-40 % and increases as initial growth increases.
These are remarkably large values and one could wonder whether it is reasonable to
accept that society would be willing to sacrifice around 30% of their lifetime income to
prevent a temperature change of 2◦C. However, it is indicative for the discussion of
how different assumptions regarding the functional forms can have to radically different
policy implications.
2.4 Policy Implications and Conclusions
The policy implications of these results are stark. As Pindyck states, in order to support
a stringent abatement policy, one has to find values for the WTP around 2-3%. However,
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following his specification, the results show that WTP is below 2% even for small values
of τ . In the case of no uncertainly, WTP to avoid any temperature change increases
as the expected temperature change increases but it is still only around 6% when one
expects ∆T = 10◦C which is far beyond the temperature change needed to end human
life as we know it. Although these estimates do not support the immediate adoption
of a stringent GHG abatement policy, they do not imply that no abatement at all is
optimal. For example, values of the WTP close to 2% is in the range of cost estimates
for compliance with the Kyoto Protocol.
I therefore examine alternative specifications of the benchmark model. Employing a
multiplicative damage function applied on the level instead of the growth of consumption
leads to an increase in the WTP but only for large values of expected temperature
change. It becomes higher though when we allow for an exponent of 3 or larger in
the damage function as it better accounts for extreme events. However, the crucial
assumption in these specifications is the substitutability between market and non-market
consumption. If one assumes that the main impact of temperature change is on things
that cannot be easily translated to material consumption such as health and biodiversity,
then an additive rather than a multiplicative utility function has to be employed. My
estimates show, that in this specification WTP gets remarkably high values even if
expected temperature change is relatively small or the target temperature change is
relatively big.
Although one could not strongly argue which is the right specification for the model,
the main purpose of this paper is to show how seemingly small differences in modeling
can have very different policy implications. Deep structural uncertainties inherent in
the climate change science require a careful treatment in order for the analysis to lead
to robust results. Moreover, a more realistic model that accounts for parametric as well
as intrinsic uncertainty in the form of exogenous shocks and risks needs to be developed,
if we are to safely answer the question of whether a stringent abatement policy needs to
be employed.
2.5 Tables
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Pindyck Additive
τ g=0.015 g=0.02 g=0.025 g=0.015 g=0.02 g=0.025
0 0.019 0.011 0.007 0.311 0.376 0.429
2 0.011 0.007 0.005 0.280 0.338 0.385
4 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.194 0.234 0.268
6 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.108 0.13 0.148
Table 2.2: Uncertainty Limited to Temperature Change
Chapter 3
When financial imperfections are not the
problem but the solution
3.1 Introduction
The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill of 2010 has focused considerable attention on the
potential liability and the operating conduct of big oil companies. In this case, BP’s
unusually “deep pockets”, made full compensation to the victims feasible, drawing at-
tention away from the glaring safety failures in both the private and the public sector.
Big oil companies make an annual purchase of roughly $500 millions of liability insur-
ance, an amount much lower than the $20 billion fund that BP was able to self-raise.
It seems that big oil companies, the same ones that are more likely to cause a catas-
trophic oil spillage, do not need to buy liability insurance at all: they have a sufficiently
diversified investment portfolio that allows them to self-insure for the vast majority of
their potential catastrophic liability. Future spills, however, may not follow this pattern
revealing the need to create incentives for the parties involved in activities with potential
catastrophic environmental consequences, to take actions to prevent such events.
In this spirit, this paper suggests that, restricting the insurance opportunities of big
oil companies in the asset markets creates incentives to internalize the welfare effects of
such catastrophic events, leading to a Pareto improved allocation for society as a whole.
I model a class of general equilibrium economies with uncertainty, where the probability
of each state rather than being exogenous, depends on the level of effort exerted by
one agent. Thus, the probabilities of different states are endogenously determined in
equilibrium. When this “effort” is costly and not contracted upon, every equilibrium
is Pareto inefficient as in all economies with imperfections, an “externality” in this
case. The intuition behind this result is straightforward: when the agent decides on
the optimal level of effort, he only takes into account the effects on his own welfare.
25
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However, as his choice of effort affects the probability of each state, it also affects the
expected social welfare, an effect that the agent fails to internalize. I then focus on
welfare improving policies, in particular on the imposition of “participation” constraints
in financial markets. I show that generically in the space of endowments, there is a
Pareto-improving policy in the form of a reallocation of existing assets. The results
extend to economies with aggregate uncertainty and complete markets as well as to
economies with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. This has the important implication that
complete markets need not to be optimal in economies with this type of externalities.
Restricting the insurance opportunities of agents is welfare improving for society as a
whole as it forces the agent to “internalize” the social cost of his choice of effort by
making him more vulnerable to risk and uncertainty.
It is well known that any equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal in competitive
economies with complete markets. Constrained optimality is a weaker version of opti-
mality that takes into account the financial structure and is appropriate for the case of
incomplete markets. As Stiglitz [92], Greenwald and Stiglitz [44] and Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis [41] have argued, in a numeraire asset model with incomplete markets,
generically every equilibrium is constrained sub-optimal provided that there is more
than one commodities and there is an upper bound in the number of individuals: re-
allocations of existing assets support superior allocations. Following Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis [41], Citanna, Kajii, Villanacci, [21] show that equilibria are generically
constrained inefficient even without an upper bound on the number of households. They
also show that perfectly anticipated lump-sum transfers in a limited number of goods are
typically effective. Carvajal and Polemarchakis [16] extend these results to economies
with no aggregate uncertainty and uninsurable idiosyncratic risk where the reallocation
of assets works through its effects on future relative prices.
The inefficiency of incomplete markets is the benchmark for the financial innova-
tion literature. Hart [50] was the first to construct an example of a competitive economy
where the equilibrium allocation with a single asset is Pareto dominated by one without
no asset at all. Therefore, contrary to what one might have thought, the introduction
of a new asset does not always improve upon welfare. As Cass and Cittana [18] and
Elul [35] have argued, introducing a new asset in an economy with incomplete markets
can be Pareto-improving or Pareto-impairing. Therefore, the choice of which assets to
introduce has important welfare effects. This result has given rise to the literature on
optimal security design. Prime examples of this strand of literature include Allen and
Gale [3] and [4], Chen [20] and Pesendorfer [78] where the main focus is the trade-off
between profitable innovation and the cost of financial intermediation as a source of
the incompleteness of the financial markets in equilibrium. Bisin [10] shows that in a
environment with profit maximizing intermediaries and intermediatery costs, markets
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are endogenously incomplete in equilibrium. Carvajal, Rostek and Weretka [17] argue
that the main force for the incompleteness of markets in equilibrium is the shape of
the marginal utility function of the investors: under convexity, competition among is-
suers of asset-backed securities who maximize asset value, results in incomplete financial
structures and inefficient risk sharing opportunities for the investors even if innovation
is essentially costless.
My work touches upon the literature on moral hazard and financial innovation. In
general equilibrium models with moral hazard, there is trade-off between higher insur-
ance opportunities and incentives to exert effort when effort is unobservable: the easier
it is to hedge risk, the fewer are the incentives to exert costly effort and increase the
probability of being in a “good state”. As a consequence, one could end up trapped in a
“bad” equilibrium where insurance is expensive and the “bad” state happens with high
probability. In these models, even when the individual probability of being in personal
state s is independent of the effort of other agents, individuals’ effort choices always
affect each other via prices, “a pecuniary” effect defined by Greenwald and Stiglitz [44]
as “moral hazard pecuniary externality”. In addition, my model allows for externalities
in the traditional sense: an agent’s welfare depends on the effort exerted by one agent
through its effect on the probability of the aggregate state, creating an additional source
of inefficiency. However, the scope of this paper is not to solve the problem of moral
hazard but rather to internalize the effect of the choice of effort on social welfare. In
the moral hazard literature, the focus is on solving the principal-agent problem or in the
case of multi-agent setup, on the reallocation of resources among individuals in order to
solve the trade-off between incentives and risk sharing. Prime examples of this literature
include Grossman and Hart [45] and Prescott and Townsend [83]. Helpman and Laffont
[51] extend the moral hazard setup to a general equilibrium model with exogenously
complete financial markets and non-exclusive transactions. A natural extension of this
framework is to endogenize the financial design. In this direction, Lisboa [63] presents a
general equilibrium model with individual and aggregate risk, moral hazard and a large
number of households where insurance is supplied by a collection of profit maximizing
firms that behave strategically. He shows that given the assumptions of Bentrand com-
petition and exclusivity, an equilibrium exists and is constrained optimal. On the other
hand, Braido [14] presents a general equilibrium model as a two-stage game where agents
act as producers, consumers and as financial intermediaries with intermediation costs.
Each individual is allowed to design a financial structure that consists of specifying se-
curities payoffs in each state and transaction constraints that restrict the participation
of some agents in some markets, while allowing for non-exclusivity. He shows that an
equilibrium exists and he offers examples and reasoning as to why the equilibrium might
be constrained inefficient and the markets endogenously incomplete. As he points out,
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apart from the financial technology and the strategic nature of financial innovation as
standard sources of inefficiency, the main source would be the non-exclusivity of con-
tracts. The inefficiency of equilibria in economies with moral hazard and non-exclusive
contracts has been extensively studied by Helpman and Laffont [51], Arnott and Stiglitz
[6], Bisin and Guaitoli [11] and Kahn and Mookherjee [55] ,where the main conclusion
is that exclusivity is necessary for constrained efficiency of equilibria. It is important
to point out the relevance of the work of Braido [14] for my model. To show how mar-
kets can be endogenously incomplete in equilibrium and how this might be optimal, he
offers an example with two agents where only one of them is risk averse. This agent
faces a production risk where the probability of the “good” state is increasing in the
costly unobservable effort he exerts. In this setup, he shows that an incomplete financial
structure, in the form of trading constraints, is Pareto superior to complete markets.
My framework is more general: all agents are risk-averse and face aggregate and/or
idiosyncratic risk. In my setup, the agent who exerts effort creates an “externality”.
Moreover, by imposing trading constraints, I am limiting the insurance opportunities
of the society and it is therefore far more demanding to show that a Pareto improving
policy exists.
Finally, the welfare improving policies that I analyze have been the subject of the
restricted participation literature. As Polemarchakis and Siconolfi [82] point out, incom-
plete markets are just a special case of an asset market with restricted participation.
In this setting, they prove the generic existence of competitive equilibria when agents
face asymmetric linear constraints on their portfolio incomes. Cass, Siconolfi and Vil-
lanaci [19] extend the literature by accommodating a wide range of portfolio constraints,
including any smooth, quasi-concave inequality constraint on households’ portfolio hold-
ings. Gori, Pireddu and Villanacci [43] focus on price-dependent borrowing restrictions.
After proving the existence of equilibria, they show that equilibria associated with a
sufficiently high number of strictly binding participation constraints in the financial
markets can be Pareto improved upon by a local change in these constraints.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts with the basic setup of an
economy with aggregate uncertainty and incomplete markets. I then present the problem
of the agent and the competitive equilibrium. I show that due to the externality created
by the inefficient level of effort chosen by the agent, equilibrium allocations are Pareto
inefficient. I then look for Pareto-improving policies. I show that generically in the
space of endowments such a policy exists. Section 3 extends my results to economies
with incomplete markets and idiosyncratic risk.
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3.2 Aggregate Uncertainty and Complete Markets
Consider a two-period economy and I + 1 individuals denoted by i = 0, ..., I. In period
0, agents receive an endowment of the single consumption good ei,0. In period 1, there
is uncertainty regarding endowments. There are only two states of the world, which I
denote by s, with s = 1, 2. Agents receive an endowment ei,1 in state 1 and ei,2 in state
2. The probabilities of each state, rather than being exogenous, depend on the actions
of agent 0. In period 0, he has the choice of exerting costly “effort”  ≥ ¯, which makes
state 1 more probable. As in standard models with moral hazard, effort is unobservable
and agent 0 only takes into account the effects of his choice on his own welfare.
The preferences of the agents, who derive utility only from the single consumption
good, are described by
U i = ci,0 + pi()ui,1(ci,1) + (1− pi())ui,2(ci,2) (3.1)
where  ∈ (¯,∞) with ¯ a lower bound for effort, pi() is the probability of state 1 and
(1−pi()) the probability of state 2. I assume that pi() ≥ 0 is an increasing and concave
function with lim
→∞pi() = 1. The state dependent utility function ui,s(ci,s) is assumed
to be continuous, strictly increasing, strongly concave and to satisfy standard Inada
conditions.12
Definition 1: Let {cˆi,s}Ii=0 with s = 1, 2, solve the following maximization problem
max
{ci,s}Ii=0
I∑
i=0
ui,s(ci,s) s.t.
I∑
i=0
ci,s =
I∑
i=0
ei,s for s = 1, 2
This gives us the Pareto optimal allocations state by state. Later, I will show that the
same optimality conditions hold at the competitive equilibrium for any given level of
effort.
Assumption 1: There exists  ∈ (¯,∞) such that
pi′() =
1
u0,1(cˆ0,1)− u0,2(cˆ0,2) ,
1 If f is differentiable on the open convex set C ∈ Rn, then it is strongly concave if and only if there
exists a > 0 such that for every x1 ∈ C and every x2 ∈ C, we have
f(x2)− f(x1) + (x2 − x1)T∇f(x1) ≤ 1
2
a ‖ x2 − x1 ‖2
2With quasilinear preferences, it is not necessary to specify the endowments of individuals at date 0.
Marginal utility is constant and equal to 1 and there is no income effect. With a more general set of
preferences, computation would be more challenging and a genericitty analysis of preferences might be
needed but the main line of the argument shold not change.
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with {cˆi,1, cˆi,2}Ii=0 as in Definition 1. This interiority assumption implies that agent 0
prefers state 1 to state 2 . Therefore it is optimal for him to exert effort since the
probability of state 1, pi(), is increasing in effort.
Finally, there is an Arrow security for each state: asset 1 pays one unit of the
consumption good only in state 1 and asset 2 pays only in state 2. Holdings of the
securities are denoted by θi,1 and θi,2 respectively with θi,s ∈ R. Therefore, the markets
are complete in the sense that there is a security for each state. It should be noted that
in my setup, effort is not contractible.
3.2.1 The problem of agent i ≥ 1
All agents other than agent 0 have only one decision to make in period 0: they have
to choose their holdings of securities, θi,1 and θi,2 and therefore their consumption in
that period and in every state in period 1, taking the prices of the securities and the
probabilities of the states as given. They face the following period 0 budget constraint
ci,0 + q1θi,1 + q2θi,2 ≤ ei,0, (3.2)
ci,0 ≥ 0 (3.3)
and in every state in period 1
ci,1 ≤ ei,1 + θi,1, (3.4)
ci,2 ≤ ei,2 + θi,2, (3.5)
ci,1 ≥ 0, (3.6)
ci,2 ≥ 0 (3.7)
where q1 and q2 are the prices for θi,1 and θi,2, respectively, while the single consumption
good is the numeraire.3 The maximization problem of the agents then becomes:
max
θi,1,θi,2
ei,0 − q1θi,1 − q2θi,2 + pi()ui,1(ei,1 + θi,1) + (1− pi())ui,2(ei,2 + θi,2), (3.8)
3The non-negativity constraints for consumption imply a lower bound on short sales of securities.
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with the following first-order conditions:
− q1 + pi()∂ui,1
∂ci,1
(ei,1 + θi,1) = 0, (3.9)
− q2 + (1− pi())∂ui,2
∂ci,2
(ei,2 + θi,2) = 0. (3.10)
3.2.2 The problem of agent i = 0
Agent 0 has an extra decision to make in period 0: apart from choosing his holdings of
securities, he must choose his level of effort. He faces the following budget constraints:
c0,0 + q1θ0,1 + q2θ0,2 ≤ e0,0 − , (3.11)
c0,1 ≤ e0,1 + θ0,1, (3.12)
c0,2 ≤ e0,2 + θ0,2, (3.13)
c0,0 ≥ 0, (3.14)
c0,1 ≥ 0, (3.15)
c0,2 ≥ 0 (3.16)
His maximisation problem becomes:
max
θ0,1,θ0,2,
e0,0−q1θ0,1−q2θ0,2−+pi()u0,1(e0,1 +θ0,1)+(1−pi())u0,2(e0,2 +θ0,2), (3.17)
with the following first order conditions:4
− 1 + pi′()(u0,1(e0,1 + θ0,1)− u0,2(e0,2 + θ0,2)) = 0, (3.18)
− q1 + pi()∂u0,1
∂c0,1
(e0,1 + θ0,1) = 0, (3.19)
− q2 + (1− pi())∂u0,2
∂c0,2
(e0,2 + θ0,2) = 0. (3.20)
4 Assumption 1 will guarantee an interior equilibrium for the optimal level of , therefore we need
not look for boundary solutions.
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Condition (3.18) implies that agent 0 prefers state 1 to state 2. Therefore, he is willing
to exert effort to raise the probability of state 1. However, in his choice of effort, he
does not internalize the effect of a more probable state 1 on society as a whole. Since
I have made no extra assumptions on aggregate endowments and social welfare in each
state, all agents other than agent 0 could be worse-off or better-off in state 1. It is this
feature that is reflecting the non-alignments of interest.
3.2.3 Competitive Equilibrium and Pareto Efficiency
The first-order conditions derived above, together with the market-clearing conditions
for the consumption good and securities
I∑
i=0
ci,0 =
I∑
i=0
ei,0 − , (3.21)
I∑
i=0
ci,s =
I∑
i=0
ei,s for s = 1, 2, (3.22)
I∑
i=0
θi,s = 0 for s = 1, 2, (3.23)
give us the equilibrium prices, quantities and effort {θ∗i,1, θ∗i,2, c∗i,0, c∗i,1, c∗i,2, ∗, q∗1, q∗2}.
On the other hand, a social planner would choose the allocation of consumption
and the level of effort so as to maximise
I∑
i=0
[ci,0 + pi()ui,1(ci,1) + (1− pi()ui,2(ci,2)], (3.24)
subject to aggregate resource constraints:
I∑
i=0
ci,0 =
I∑
i=0
ei,0 − , (3.25)
I∑
i=0
ci,i =
I∑
i=0
ei,1, (3.26)
I∑
i=0
ci,2 =
I∑
i=0
ei,2, (3.27)
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Given the quasilinerity of preferences and the above constraints, the first-order condi-
tions that characterize Pareto efficiency are:
− 1 + pi′()
(
I∑
i=0
ui,1(ci,1)−
I∑
i=0
ui,2(ci,2)
)
= 0 for an interior solution, (3.28)
pi()
∂ui,1(c
i
1)
∂ci1
− λ1 = 0 for every agent i = 0, ...I, (3.29)
(1− pi())∂ui,2(ci,2)
∂ci,2
− λ2 = 0 for every agent i = 0, ...I, (3.30)
where λs is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint in s = 1, 2.
Solving for the multipliers, the following conditions fully characterize the equilibrium
allocation and prices:
pi′()
(
I∑
i=0
ui,1(ci,1)−
I∑
i=0
ui,2(ci,2)
)
= 1 for an interior solution, (3.31)
∂ui,1(ci,1)
∂ci,1
=
∂uj,1(cj,1)
∂cj,1
for every agent i and j with i 6= j, (3.32)
∂ui,2(ci,2)
∂ci,2
=
∂uj,2(cj,2)
∂cj,2
for every agent i and j with i 6= j, (3.33)
Looking at equations (3.32) and (3.33) and comparing them with the FOC’s of the
agent’s problem, it is easy to see that for a given level of effort, the allocations of
consumption prescribed by the competitive equilibrium would be Pareto efficient in the
sense that the marginal rates of substitutions would be equalized across agents in each
state. However, comparing (3.18) with (3.31), it is immediate that the level of effort
implied by the competitive equilibrium solution is generically not Pareto optimal: while
agent 0 takes into account only the effects on his own welfare, the social planner considers
the effects on social welfare when choosing the optimal level of effort.5
3.2.4 Constrained inefficiency and Welfare improving policies
I have shown that competitive equilibria need not be Pareto efficient. However, this does
not mean that a social planner, constrained by the financial structure, would indeed be
5For simplicity we have shown the FOC for an interior  and the Pareto inefficiency of the competitive
equilibrium level. For a boundary solution with the optimal level of effort at ¯, it is easy to see that the
competitive level of effort is inefficiently high.
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able to find a welfare improving policy. If such a welfare improving policy exists, then I
say that the competitive equilibrium is constrained-inefficient.
I start by writing the expression for social welfare:
SW = −+ pi()
(
I∑
i=1
ui,1(ci,1) + u0,1(c0,1)
)
+ (1− pi())
(
I∑
i=1
ui,2(ci,2) + u0,2(c0,2)
)
,
(3.34)
The problem arises from the inefficient level of effort chosen by agent 0 when maximizing
his utility. Because his effort is unobservable, I consider a perturbation in the holdings
of securities of agent 0. The idea is to restrict his insurance opportunities to make him
more vulnerable to the risks associated with each state. The perturbation (dθ0,1, dθ0,2)
around the competitive equilibrium values gives us the following expression
dSW =− d+ pi′()
(
I∑
i=1
ui,1(ci,1) + u0,1(c0,1)−
I∑
i=1
ui,2(ci,2)− u0,2(c0,2)
)
d
+ pi()
(
I∑
i=1
(
∂ui,1(ci,1)
∂ci,1
dci,1
)
+
∂u0,1(c0,1)
∂c0,1
dc0,1
)
+ (1− pi())
(
I∑
i=1
(
∂ui,2(ci,2)
∂ci,2
dci,2
)
+
∂u0,2(c0,2)
∂c0,2
dc0,2
)
(3.35)
The first line of equation (3.35) shows the welfare effects associated with a change in
effort induced by the perturbation of asset holdings, and the second and third lines show
the direct effects of a reallocation of assets. Since, the only source of inefficiency in our
model is the level of effort, the terms in the second and third line vanish. Indeed using
(3.18), (3.32) and (3.33), equation (3.35) can be rewritten as
dSW =pi′()
(
I∑
i=1
ui,1(ci,1)−
I∑
i=1
ui,2(ci,2)
)
d+ pi()
(
∂u0,1(cˆ0,1)
∂c0,1
I∑
i=0
dci,1
)
+ (1− pi())
(
∂u0,2(cˆ0,2)
∂c0,2
I∑
i=0
dci,2
)
(3.36)
At equilibrium
∑I
i=0 dci,1 = 0 and
∑I
i=0 dci,2 = 0, so that I can finally write
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dSW = pi′()
(
I∑
i=1
ui,1(ci,1)−
I∑
i=1
ui,2(ci,2)
)
d (3.37)
where d is the change in the optimal level of effort induced by the perturbation of asset
holdings in (3.18)
pi′′()(u0,1(e0,1+θ0,1)−u0,2(e0,2+θ0,2))d+pi′()
(
∂u0,1
∂c0,1
(e0,1 + θ0,1)dc0,1 − ∂u0,2
∂c0,2
(e0,2 + θ0,2)dc0,2
)
= 0,
(3.38)
so that6
d =
pi′()
(
∂u0,2
∂c0,2
(e0,2 + θ0,2)dc0,2 − ∂u0,1(e0,1+θ0,1)∂c0,1 dc0,1
)
pi′′()(u0,1(e0,1 + θ0,1)− u0,2(e0,2 + θ0,2)) (3.39)
The direction of the Pareto improving policy depends on the sign of
∑I
i=1 ui,1(ci,1)−∑I
i=1 ui,2(ci,2). Positive values imply that society, excluding agent 0, is better off in state
1 than in state 2. As a result, d must be positive: the competitive level of effort is too
low and the Pareto improving policy involves inducing agent 0 to increase the level of
effort chosen at equilibrium. Looking at (3.39), this can be achieved with dθ0,2 < 0 and
dθ0,1 > 0. The idea is that in order to induce agent 0 to exert more effort in equilibrium,
I would like to restrict his insurance opportunities in a way that he is better off in the
state associated with higher effort, namely state 1 and worse off in state 2. In this way,
due to the lack of optimal insurance, the agent would like to make state 1, in which he
is now better off, more probable by choosing a higher level of effort than before. The
agent is therefore “forced”to internalize the externality through considerations for his
own welfare. In the case where
∑I
i=1 ui,1(ci,1)−
∑I
i=1 ui,2(ci,2) < 0, the society excluding
agent 0 is better off in state 2, so that the competitive level of effort is inefficiently high:
in this case, Pareto optimality prescribes d < 0 which can be achieved with dθ0,2 > 0
and dθ0,1 < 0. The intuition is again that I would like to make agent 0 better off in the
state associated with lower effort and worse off in the other state so that it is optimal
for him to choose a lower level of effort than before. I should note that it can be easily
shown that
∑I
i=1 ui,1(ci,1) −
∑I
i=1 ui,2(ci,2) 6= 0 generically in the space of endowments
so that there is almost always a Pareto improving policy. The proof is shown in the
appendix.
6Note that Assumption 1 implies that in equilibrium, (u0,1(e0,1 + θ0,1)− u0,2(e0,2 + θ0,2)) > 0.
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Remark 1: I have considered a policy intervention in the form of a reallocation of
assets for agent 0. However, the same analysis applies if one wants to consider imposing
binding participation constraints in the financial markets. In that case, I would start
with constraints or upper and lower bounds on sales and purchases of securities, exactly
at the levels of the original competitive equilibrium. Then, by making these constraints
or bounds stricter therefore binding for agent 0, I can study the welfare effects of limiting
the insurance opportunities and inducing a new level effort at equilibrium. However in
this case it is important to check for potential non-convexities.
Remark 2: For simplicity, I have assumed there are only two states in period 1. How-
ever, it is easy to show that the results extend to economies with any finite number of
states. The model and the proofs for such an economy are presented in the Appendix
B.
The above analysis suggests that it is possible to correct a failure in the market
by creating one more: by restricting the access of agent 0 in the insurance market
and therefore limiting the insurance opportunities for the rest of the agents too, I get
equilibrium allocations which are Pareto superior to the ones without any constraints.
Therefore, in the particular structure of our model, complete markets are not enough for
Pareto efficiency. The traditional theory in the restricted participation literature seems
to conclude that removing or relaxing these constraints is welfare improving. Instead,
in my setup, the imposition of such restrictions and the resulting insurance inefficiency
seem to be welfare improving for the society as a whole.
3.3 Idiosyncratic risk and Incomplete markets
As an alternative framework and in order to show that my results extend to economies
with idiosyncratic risk, I will study a model of incomplete markets where agents are
subject to idiosyncratic shocks. Individuals are of different types i = 0, ..., I and within
each type there is a continuum of individuals of mass 1. Individuals of different types
differ in their period 1 preferences and in their endowments but they face the same
idiosyncratic shocks. For simplicity, I assume that there are only 3 personal states
denoted by s, with s = 1, 2, 3. In s = 1 there is no shock in the endowment of the
consumption good while in s = 2, 3 there is a positive and negative shock respectively of
size z. In period 1, a fraction pi() of the individuals shall find themselves in s = 1 while
an equal fraction of 12(1− pi()) shall find themselves in s = 2, 3 respectively. However,
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there is no aggregate uncertainty: the aggregate endowment of the economy in period 1
is
∑I
i=0 e¯
i where e¯i is the endowment of an individual of type i when there is no shock.7
Once again, the probabilities of each personal state depend on the aggregate effort
agents of type 0 will choose to exert. In particular, while the expected value of endow-
ment remains unchanged with effort, higher effort increases the probability of no shock
while it decreases the probability of a positive or negative shock. Therefore effort has an
effect on the variance of the distribution of shocks but not on the expected value: a risk
averse agent would prefer a less “variant”distribution and this is why he would decide
to exert effort.
Finally, there is only a riskless asset that can be traded: it pays one unit of the
consumption good at date 1. Holdings of the asset are bi and its price is q.
3.3.1 Competitive Equilibrium and Constrained Inefficiency
Once again, all agents other than agent 0, have to choose their holdings of the riskless
bond and therefore the consumption in period 0 and in every personal state in period
1. The maximization problem an agent of type i faces is
max
bi
ei0 − qbi + pi(¯0)ui(e¯i + bi)
+
1
2
(1− pi(¯0))ui(e¯i + z + bi) + 1
2
(1− pi(¯0))ui(e¯i − z + bi) (3.40)
where e¯i is the endowment of individual in s = 1 when there is no shock and z is the
shock. The probability of each state depends on the aggregate level of effort exerted
by agents of type 0, denoted with ¯0. Taking the price of the riskless bond and the
probabilities of the personal states as given, they choose bi according to
q =pi(¯0)
∂ui
∂ci
(ei + bi)
+
1
2
(1− pi(¯0))
(
∂ui
∂ci
(ei + z + bi) +
∂ui
∂ci
(ei − z + bi)
)
(3.41)
7Let the endowment of an individual of type i in states 1,2 and 3 be given by e¯i, e¯i + z and e¯i − z
respectively. There is no aggregate risk and the aggregate endowment of the economy is given by
I∑
i=0
(
pi()e¯i +
1
2
(1− pi())(e¯i + z) + 1
2
(1− pi())(e¯i − z)
)
=
I∑
i=0
e¯i
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On the other hand, agent j of type 0 has to solve
max
b0j ,
0
j
e0j0−qb0j−0j+pi(0j )u0j (e¯0j+b0j )+
1
2
(1−pi(0j ))u0j (e¯0j+z+b0j )+
1
2
(1−pi(0j ))u0j (e¯0j−z+b0j )
(3.42)
It is imporant to note that although I have assumed that the probability of each state
depends on the aggregate effort exerted by all agents of type 0, when an agent j of type
0 solves his maximization problem, he sees the probability of each state as depending
only on his own level of effort. In equilibrium, as there is a continuum of type 0 agents
of mass 1, it is true that 0j = ¯
0.
Now, the FOC are8
1 = pi′(0j )
(
(u0j (e
0
j + b
0
j )−
1
2
u0j (e
0
j + z + b
0
j )−
1
2
u0j (e
0
j − z + b0j )
)
(3.43)
q = pi(0j )
∂u0j (e
0
j + b
0
j )
∂c0j
+
1
2
(1− pi(0j ))
(
∂u0j (e
0
j + z + b
0
j )
∂c0j
+
∂u0j (e
0
j − z + b0j )
∂c0j
)
(3.44)
The above FOC together with the market clearing conditions
I∑
i=0
ci0 =
I∑
i=0
ei0 − ¯0 (3.45)
I∑
i=0
3∑
s=1
pis(¯
0)cis =
I∑
i=0
e¯i (3.46)
I∑
i=0
bi = 0 (3.47)
8As with the case of complete markets, I can make similar interiority assumptions so that we do not
have to look for boundary solutions.
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give us the equilibrium prices and quantities and level of effort (b∗i, c∗i0 , c∗i1 , c∗i2 , ¯∗, q∗).9
Now consider a policy intervention which perturbs the holdings of the riskless bond
of all agents of type 0. Again, this policy could be thought as imposing binding par-
ticipation constraints on agents of type 0. The welfare effects of policy db0 around the
competitive equilibrium point are
dSW =− d¯0 + pi′(¯0)
(
I∑
i=0
(
ui(ci1) + u
0(c01)
)− 1
2
I∑
i=0
(
ui(ci2)− u0(c02)
)− 1
2
I∑
i=0
(
ui(ci3)− u0(c03)
))
d¯0
+ pi(¯0)
(
I∑
i=1
(
∂ui(ci1)
∂ci1
dci1
)
+
∂u0(c01)
∂c01
dc01
)
+
1
2
(1− pi(¯0))
(
I∑
i=1
(
∂ui(ci2)
∂ci2
dci2
)
+
∂u0(c02)
∂c02
+
I∑
i=1
(
∂ui(ci3)
∂ci3
dci3
)
+
∂u0(c03)
∂c03
dc03
)
(3.48)
which as before, taking into account the FOC of the agents at the equilibrium point and
the market clearing conditions can be written as
dSW = pi′(¯0)
(
I∑
i=1
ui(e¯i + bi)− 1
2
I∑
i=1
ui(e¯i + z + bi)− 1
2
I∑
i=1
ui(e¯i − z + bi)
)
d¯0
(3.49)
where
d¯0 = −
pi′(¯0)
(
∂u0(e¯0+b0)
∂c01
dc01 − 12 ∂u
0(e¯0+z+b0)
∂c02
dc02 − 12 ∂u
0(e¯0−z+b0)
∂c03
dc03
)
pi′′(¯0)
(
u0(e¯0 + b0)− 12u0(e¯0 + z + b0)− 12u0(e¯0 − z + b0)
) (3.50)
By strong concavity,
∑I
i=1 u
i(e¯i+ bi)− 12
∑I
i=1 u
i(e¯i+ z+ bi)− 12
∑I
i=1 u
i(e¯i− z+ bi) > 0
which implies that the competitive level of effort is inefficiently low: an increase in the
9 Equation (3.46) gives the market clearing condition of the economy in t = 1. The LHS is the
aggregate consumption across all types of individuals: pis can be thought as the fraction of individuals
of type i that are in personal state s so that
∑3
s=1 pis(¯
0)cis is aggregate consumption for individuals of
type i.
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level of effort would be welfare improving for the whole society. Then, equation (3.50)
implies that the direction of the perturbation of the bond holdings of agent 0 that im-
plements a higher level of effort depends on the sign of (∂u
0(e¯0+b0)
∂b0
− 12 ∂u
0(e¯0+z+b0)
∂b0
−
1
2
∂u0(e¯0−z+b0)
∂b0
). For a concave marginal utility function db0 > 0 : saving more in equilib-
rium is welfare improving for the whole society. Instead, for a convex marginal utility
function db0 < 0 : agent 0 should save less in equilibrium. In both cases, the restriction
of agent 0 to save optimally induces him to exert a higher level of effort since by doing so
he makes the future look less “volatile”: the probability of no shock increases while the
probability of shocks, positive or negative decreases which is desirable for a risk-averse
agent.
3.4 Concluding Remarks and Applications
In this paper I have argued that, in economies with uncertainty and states of the world
which depend on the level of effort exerted by one agent, the equilibrium is Pareto
inefficient: agent 0 imposes an externality on society as he takes into account only the
effect on his own welfare in his optimal choice of effort. In equilibrium, the level of effort
can be inefficiently low or high depending on the aggregate welfare of all agents excluding
agent 0 in each state. This result extends to economies with aggregate uncertainty and
complete markets as well as to economies with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. Therefore,
although agents are price takers and they could potentially have full insurance in the
case of complete markets, a market failure occurs. A more interesting question then is,
whether the existing assets can be used to induce a Pareto improvement.
I show that generically in the space of endowments, there is a Pareto-improving
policy in the form of a reallocation of existing assets in both the cases of complete and
incomplete markets. This has the important implication that complete markets need
not be optimal in an economy with probability externalities: restricting the insurance
opportunities of the agents is welfare improving for the society as a whole. However, my
argument does not offer any insight on what information is necessary for the determina-
tion of a Pareto improving financial intervention; it only says that one such intervention
typically exists.
The above analysis provides useful insight on how to deal with big oil companies
and the catastrophic risk of an oil spillage. The recent BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill
has revealed glaring safety failures in both the private and the public sector. In this case,
BP’s unusually deep pockets made full compensation feasible. However, the question is
how to create incentives for the parties involved in activities with potential environmental
consequences, to take actions to prevent such events. Since big oil companies do not have
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full insurance against their potential pollution liability but are instead “self- insured ” by
being sufficiently diversified in their portfolio investments, the above analysis suggests
that a less diversified portfolio could make the society as a whole better off. The lack
of a clear regulatory framework becomes even more worrying if one considers smaller
firms and the possibility of bankruptcy. In that case, a small firm would be unable to
cover the damages associated with an oil spillage and the damages would go unabated
or most probably it would fall to the hands of the state and the general public to cover
the losses and compensate the victims through public funds and taxation.
More generally, this model provides a useful framework for the discussion of how
to give incentives to firms, whose actions could trigger a potential disaster, to take the
necessary actions when they have limited liability. With limited liability, firms do not
fully internalize the cost of their actions as they are not going to bear all the cost in the
case of a disaster. One such case are nuclear plants as discussed by Eberl and Jus [34].
The basic mechanism is the fact that a nuclear plant company (NPC) cannot lose more
than the legally defined liability capital or, in the worst case, its equity capital, even if
the damage of a nuclear accident is much higher. This reduces the incentive to invest in
costly nuclear safety and leads the NPC to a socially excessive risk level by taking into
account that a share of the loss would not need to be borne by it, but could be shifted
to a third party.
Finally, this model can be extended to the case of environmental externalities and
natural disasters. In this case, a firm’s actions contribute to the deterioration of the
environmental quality for example through CO2 emissions and the subsequent increase in
temperature. Temperature change is considered to be the leading factor for the increase
in the number of extreme events such as droughts and floods. As a consequence, a firm
is affecting the probability of extreme events or in other words, the state of the world.
However, in its choice of effort, for example investing in cleaner technologies, the firm
takes into account the effect only on its own welfare and fails to internalize the social
cost. In this case, my analysis suggests that restricting the insurance opportunities of
the firm makes it more vulnerable to the risk and creates incentives for higher level of
effort.
Chapter 4
Environmental Externalities and Fiscal Policy
(with A. Carvajal and J. Da´vila)
The role of public policy in environmental problems is a hotly debated issue among
economists and non economists alike. The only consensus seems to be that if there is
to be public intervention it has to come as an incentive-based instrument rather than
command and control. The early “Pigouvian” literature on externalities and corrective
taxes has argued that it would be sufficient to levy a tax on an externality generating
activity equal to its social marginal damage. However, Pigou taxes would be sufficient
to achieve Pareto optimality only in a first best environment. In a second best set-
ting, where there are other distortionary taxes in the system, this prescription must be
modified. The problem was originally studied by Sandmo [88] and more recently by
Bovenberg and Van der Ploeg [12]. What they have shown is what Sandmo called the
“additivity property” where the presence of externality only changes the tax formula for
the externality generating good but leaves the optimal income and commodity taxes un-
affected. Bovenberg and Van der Ploeg [13] and Bovenberg and de Mooiz [12] conclude
that “in the presence of pre-existing distortionary taxes, the optimal pollution tax typ-
ically lies below the Pigouvian tax...”. In other words, while the first best rule calls for
a tax that is only corrective, the second best tax embodies both corrective and optimal
tax objectives, a tax structure which may be described as “Ramsey plus Pigou”. Fol-
lowing the above literature, Cremer, Gahvari and Ladoux [24] and Cremer, Gahvari and
Ladoux [25] allow for more than one polluting goods and for non linear taxation casting
light on the importance and the relevance of the separability restrictions on preferences
required for the above result and concluding that the optimal environmental levy amy
exceed, fall short of, or be equal to the Pigouvian tax depending on the assumptions
made.
What this literature is lacking however, is a more general treatment of the econ-
omy, in terms of the preferences, the type of externalities and the available correcting
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mechanisms. In economies with heterogeneous preferences, tax intervention is often said
to be counterproductive because competitive equilibria cannot be improved by anony-
mous taxes. In this direction, Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [40] are the first to offer
a generic analysis of competitive equilibria and optimality in economies with exter-
nalities. They show that, generically in the space of exchange economies with linear,
separable consumption externalities and heterogeneous preferences, competitive equi-
libria exist and are constrained inefficient: there exists a policy intervention, in the
form of anonymous taxes on the purchases of commodities, and anonymous, uniform
transfers of revenue, which are balanced from a fiscal point of view that induce welfare
improvements for all agents in the economy. While this is the first paper that explores
the existence of anonymous Pareto-improving taxes in an economy with externalities,
the analogous question with different market failures such market incompleteness and
moral hazard, has been analyzed repeatedly. With uncertainty and an incomplete as-
set market, Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [40] proved the constrained suboptimality
of competitive equilibrium allocations: generically, there is a reallocation of assets that
leads to a Pareto superior allocation of goods after prices in commodity spot markets ad-
just and markets clear. Citanna et al. [22] showed that taxation, which is anonymous,
could induce a Pareto improving reallocation of assets. Carvajal and Polemarchakis
[16] extend these results to economies with no aggregate uncertainty and uninsurable
idiosyncratic risk where the reallocation of assets works through its effects on future
relative prices. They also provide examples of how their argument could be applied in
an OLG economy.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a model to study the existence of anonymous
Pareto-improving taxes and subsidies in the generic space of exchange economies with
heterogeneous agents. We plan to apply the results of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis
[40] to the more stylized framework used in environmental economics, in order to bring
to the attention of environmental economists the more recent developments on market
failure theory. This will require us to extend the original results to production economies,
while adding much generality to the framework used, for instance, by Sandmo. Impor-
tantly, we will also study the case of externalities in an OLG with heterogeneous agents,
setting, extending and applying the results of Carvajal and Polemarchakis [16] where
the market failure is instead through a missing market for securities.
In the next sections, we present a benchmark model of an infinite-horizon produc-
tion economy where production activities generate pollution. We solve for the competi-
tive equilibrium and we show that as in all economies with externalities, the equilibrium
is Pareto inefficient. We then focus on the design of the optimal fiscal policy for the
implementation of the first-best. We find that a mix of tax on capital and labor, com-
bined with a subsidy on afforestation and lump-sum transfers implement the first-best
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allocation. Next, we will build upon this model to allow for heterogeneous agents and
an OLG setup. In such a framework, the lack of information makes the decentralization
of the first best infeasible. Instead, one should ask if there are any Pareto improving
policies at all. The focus is then on proving the constrained inefficiency of the competi-
tive equilibrium. The extension of the model to allow for heterogeneous preferences and
an OLG setup is part of our ongoing research.
4.1 The Economy
Consider an infinite-horizon economy. A representative household derives utility from
consumption, ct, and from leisure. Denoting by lt the labor supplied by the household,
we model its preferences as
u(ct, γt)− v(lt, γt),
where γt represents the state of the world’s environment. We interpret this state as the
amount of greenhouse gases accumulated in the atmosphere, so that
uγ < 0, vγ > 0, ucγ < 0, and vlγ > 0.
Output, yt, is produced using capital, kt, and labor, with a constant-returns-to-scale
technology
yt = A(γt)F (Kt, lt),
where the total factor productivity depends negatively on the stock of greenhouse gases,
A′ < 0. The intuition behind this assumption is that a deteriorating natural environment
negatively affects productivity of the direct factors of production, e.g. by increasing
natural depreciation, reducing the quality of natural inputs or by deteriorating the health
of workers.
Output can be used for consumption, for capital accumulation, or for afforestation (and
reforestation) activities, at. Assuming full capital depreciation, the aggregate resources
constraint is that
ct + kt+1 + at ≤ yt.
Production activities generate pollution, pt. In order to allow for the possibility
that capital and labor produce different greenhouse gas emissions, we model
pt = P (kt, lt),
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where
Pk > 0, and Pl ≥ 0.
Also, we impose the condition that
Pl − Fl
Fk
Pk ≤ 0,
which guarantees that the substitution of capital for labor along an output isoquant
does not increment greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, labor is considered a “cleaner”
technology than capital. 1
The state of the environment evolves according to the difference equation
γt+1 = γt + pt − S(γt, at),
where S represents the sequestration of greenhouse gases. We are assuming that, Sa > 0
which means that increasing afforestation activities increase sequestration of greenhouse
gas emissions, Sγ < 0, meaning that the worse the state of the environment is, the less
efficient sequestration is and S(γt, at) concave implying decreasing efficiency of seques-
tration.
4.2 Competitive Equilibrium
Denote the prices of capital and labor as rt and wt, respectively.
1A direct implication of this assumption is that the use of the “cleaner” factor, labor, instead of “dirty”
capital will have as a result a lower level of overall taxation and therefore there are clear incentives to
use the c This is shown in what follows for a situation in which we are in a steady state. Denote with
∆ the change in total taxation then
∆ = τwdl + τrdk
and we require that ∆ ≤ 0. Notice that in order to have no change at the level of production we need
that dk = −dl Fl
Fk
which we substitute in the above expression and we get(
τw − τr
(
Fl
Fk
))
dl = ∆
Therefore for ∆ ≤ 0 we need that
τw ≤ τr
(
Fl
Fk
)
or
Pl
Sa
≤ Pk
Sa
(
Fl
Fk
)
which is the initial assumption that we have made.
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4.2.1 The competitive household
The household takes as given the sequence {rt, wt} of prices, as well the sequence {γt}
that represents the evolution of the stock of greenhouse gases. Given these sequences,
it chooses the plan {lt, ct, at, kt+1} so as to maximize its discounted utility,
∞∑
t=0
βt[u(ct, γt)− v(lt, γt)],
subject to the budget constraint that
ct + kt+1 + at ≤ wtlt + rtkt.
It is immediate from the formulation of the problem that the household optimally
chooses at = 0 at all periods. The first-order conditions of its problem are hence that,
at all periods,
βtuc(ct, γt) = λt,
βtvl(lt, γt) = λtwt,
λt = λt+1rt+1,
for a sequence {λt} of positive numbers, while
ct + kt+1 = wtlt + rtkt,
with k0 given.
4.2.2 The competitive firm
The firm also takes as given the sequences {rt, wt} and {γt}, and chooses its demands
for capital and labor, at each period, so as to maximize
yt − wtlt − rtkt,
subject to the technological constraint that
yt = A(γt)F (kt, lt),
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Substituting the constraint into the objective function, we can rewrite the problem as
choosing a sequence {lt, kt} so as to maximize
A(γt)F (kt, lt)− wtlt − rtkt
at each period. The first-order conditions of this problem are that
A(γt)Fl(kt, lt) = wt,
A(γt)Fk(kt, lt) = rt.
4.2.3 The equilibrium
The following conditions characterize the evolution of sequence {ct, lt, kt+1, γt+1} at a
competitive equilibrium:
vl(lt, γt)
uc(ct, γt)
= A(γt)Fl(kt, lt), (CE1)
uc(ct, γt)
βuc(ct+1, γt+1)
= A(γt+1)Fk(kt+1, lt+1), (CE2)
ct + kt+1 = A(γt)F (kt, lt), (CE3)
γt+1 = γt + P (kt, lt)− S(γt, 0), (CE4)
given initial conditions (k0, γ0).
4.3 First Best
A central planner would choose the sequence {c¯t, k¯t+1, l¯t, a¯t, γt} so as to maximize the
discounted household utility
∞∑
t=0
βt[u(c¯t, γt)− v(l¯t, γt)]
subject to the aggregate resources constraint that
c¯t + k¯t+1 + a¯t ≤ A(γt)F (k¯t, l¯t)
and to the evolution of the state of the environment,
γt+1 = γt + P (k¯t, l¯t)− S(γt, a¯t),
given initial conditions (k¯0, γ0) = (k0, γ0).
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The first-order conditions of this problem are that, at all periods,
βtuc(ct, γt)
0
−βtvl(lt, γt)
0
βt[uγ(ct, γt)− vγ(lt, γt)]

= δt

1
1
−A(γt)Fl(kt, lt)
1
−A′(γt)F (kt, lt)

+ δt+1

0
−A(γt+1)Fk(kt+1, lt+1)
0
0
0

+µt−1

0
0
0
0
−1

+ µt

0
0
Pl(kt, lt)
−Sa(γt, at)
1− Sγ(γt, at)

+ µt+1

0
Pk(kt+1, lt+1)
0
0
0

that is to say
βtuc(c¯t, γt) = δt
βtvl(l¯t, γt) = δtA(γt)Fl(k¯t, l¯t)− µtPl(k¯t, l¯t)
δt = δt+1A(γt+1)Fk(k¯t+1, l¯t+1)− µt+1Pk(k¯t+1, l¯t+1)
δt = µtSa(γt, a¯t)
βt[uγ(ct, γt)− vγ(lt, γt)] = −δtA′(γt)F (kt, lt)− µt−1 + µt(1− Sγ(γt, at))
for a sequence {δt, µt} of numbers, where δt is positive at all periods, as well as the
equalities
c¯t + k¯t+1 = A(γ¯t)F (k¯t, l¯t),
γ¯t+1 = γ¯t + P (k¯t, l¯t)− S(γ¯t, a¯t).
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Solving for the multipliers from the first-order system, we have that the following
conditions characterize the evolution of sequence {c¯t, l¯t, k¯t+1, a¯t, γ¯t+1} at the first best:
vl(l¯t, γ¯t)
uc(c¯t, γ¯t)
= A(γ¯t)Fl(k¯t, l¯t)− Pl(k¯t, l¯t)
Sa(γ¯t, a¯t)
(FB1)
uc(c¯t, γ¯t)
βuc(c¯t+1, γ¯t+1)
= A(γ¯t+1)Fk(k¯t+1, l¯t+1)− Pk(k¯t+1, l¯t+1)
Sa(γ¯t+1, a¯t+1)
(FB2)
vγ(ct, γt)− uγ(ct, γt)
uc(ct, γt)
= A′(γt)F (kt, lt)
+
vl(lt−1, γt−1)− uc(lt−1, γt−1)A(γt−1)Fl(kt−1, lt−1)
βuc(ct, γt)Pl(kt−1, lt−1)
− 1− Sγ(γt, at)
Sa(γt, at)
(FB2.5)
c¯t + k¯t+1 + a¯t = A(γ¯t)F (k¯t, l¯t) (FB3)
γ¯t+1 = γ¯t + P (k¯t, l¯t)− S(γ¯t, a¯t), (FB4)
given the initial conditions (k¯0, γ¯0) = (k0, γ0).
4.4 Implementation of the First Best
It is immediate from the comparison of (CE1)–(CE2) and (FB1)–(FB2) that in the pres-
ence of pollution the competitive equilibrium allocation is inefficient —not to mention
that (FB2.5) needs not hold at a competitive equilibrium. This is because the compet-
itive decisions on capital and labor usage, and on expenditure in afforestation ignore
their effects on the state of the environment.
4.4.1 Competitive equilibrium under intervention
Suppose that a fiscal policy levies taxes at rates τwt and τ
r
t on the labor and capital
revenues of the household, and distributes lump-sum transfers Tt to it. Suppose also
that an environmental policy specifies a schedule σt(a) of subsidies that the household
will receive if it spends the amount a of its revenue in afforestation.
Then, the competitive household is going to choose plan {l˜t, c˜t, a˜t, k˜t+1} so as to
maximize ∞∑
t=0
βt[u(c˜t, γt)− v(l˜t, γt)],
subject to the budget constraint that
c˜t + k˜t+1 + a˜t ≤ (wt − τwt )l˜t + (rt − τkt )k˜t + Tt + σt(a˜t).
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The first order conditions of this problem require that
βtuc(c˜t, γt) = λ˜t,
βtvl(l˜t, γt) = λ˜t(wt − τwt ),
λ˜t = λ˜t+1(rt+1 − τ rt+1),
σ′t(a˜t) = 1.
for a sequence {λ˜t} of positive numbers, while
c˜t + k˜t+1 + a˜t = (wt − τwt )l˜t + (rt − τkt )k˜t + Tt + σt(a˜t).
The first-order conditions of the competitive firm remain the same, whereas the
evolution of the stock of greenhouse gases is now given by
γt+1 = γt + P (k˜t, l˜t)− S(γt, a˜t),
and the budget balancedness of fiscal policy requires that
τwt l˜t + τ
k
t k˜t − σt(a˜t) = Tt.
As before, we can characterize the sequence {c˜t, l˜t, k˜t+1, γ˜t+1} at a competitive
equilibrium under intervention:
vl(l˜t, γ˜t)
uc(c˜t, γ˜t)
= A(γ˜t)Fl(k˜t, l˜t)− τwt , (CEI1)
uc(c˜t, γ˜t)
βuc(c˜t+1, γ˜t+1)
= A(γ˜t+1)Fk(k˜t+1, l˜t+1)− τ rt , (CEI2)
σ′t(a˜t) = 1, (CEI3)
c˜t + k˜t+1 + a˜t = A(γ˜t)F (k˜t, l˜t), (CEI4)
τwt l˜t + τ
k
t k˜t − σt(a˜t) = Tt, (CEI5)
γ˜t+1 = γ˜t + P (k˜t, l˜t)− S(γ˜t, a˜t), (CEI6)
given initial conditions (k˜0, γ˜0) = (k0, γ0).
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4.4.2 Optimal intervention
Since the first best is characterized by
vl(l¯t, γ¯t)
uc(c¯t, γ¯t)
= A(γ¯t)Fl(k¯t, l¯t)− Pl(k¯t, l¯t)
Sa(γ¯t, a¯t)
(FB1)
uc(c¯t, γ¯t)
βuc(c¯t+1, γ¯t+1)
= A(γ¯t+1)Fk(k¯t+1, l¯t+1)− Pk(k¯t+1, l¯t+1)
Sa(γ¯t+1, a¯t+1)
(FB2)
vγ(ct, γt)− uγ(ct, γt)
uc(ct, γt)
= A′(γt)F (kt, lt)
+
vl(lt−1, γt−1)− uc(lt−1, γt−1)A(γt−1)Fl(kt−1, lt−1)
βuc(ct, γt)Pl(kt−1, lt−1)
− 1− Sγ(γt, at)
Sa(γt, at)
(FB2.5)
c¯t + k¯t+1 + a¯t = A(γ¯t)F (k¯t, l¯t) (FB3)
γ¯t+1 = γ¯t + P (k¯t, l¯t)− S(γ¯t, a¯t), (FB4)
given the initial conditions (k¯0, γ¯0) = (k0, γ0), where (FB2.5) can be written as
Φ(γt, kt, lt, γt−1, kt−1, lt−1)Sa(γt, at) + Sγ(γt, at) = 1
with
Φ(γt, kt, lt, γt−1, kt−1, lt−1, ct) = A′(γt)F (kt, lt)
+
vl(lt−1, γt−1)− uc(lt−1, γt−1)A(γt−1)Fl(kt−1, lt−1)
βuc(ct, γt)Pl(kt−1, lt−1)
− vγ(ct, γt)− uγ(ct, γt)
uc(ct, γt)
(4.1)
Consider the following intervention. Let the fiscal policy be 2
τwt =
Pl(k¯t, l¯t)
Sa(γ¯t, a¯t)
τ rt =
Pk(k¯t+1, l¯t+1)
Sa(γ¯t+1, a¯t+1)
σt(at) = Φ(γt, kt, lt, γt−1, kt−1, lt−1, ct)S(γt, at) +
∫ at
Sγ(γt, a)da
Tt =
Pl(k¯t, l¯t)
Sa(γ¯t, a¯t)
l¯t +
Pk(k¯t+1, l¯t+1)
Sa(γ¯t+1, a¯t+1)
k¯t − σt(a¯t)
2Notice that σt depends explicitly only on at and, specifically, not on lt, ct: this is meant to convey
that agents are not aware of these dependencies when they maximize
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It is immediate that (CEI3) implies (FB2.5), whereas the definition of Tt implies
condition (CEI5), provided that (k˜t, l˜t) = (k¯t, l¯t). Now, equations (CEI1), (CEI2),
(CEI4) and (CEI6) are equivalent to (FB1), (FB2), (FB3) and (FB4), respectively,
which suffices to imply that the policy intervention implements the first best allocation.
4.5 Conclusions and Further Research
We have presented a benchmark model of an infinite-horizon production economy where
production activities generate pollution. We solved for the competitive equilibrium and
showed that as in all economies with externalities, the equilibrium is Pareto inefficient.
We then focused on the design of the optimal fiscal policy for the implementation of the
first-best. We found that a mix of tax on capital and labor, combined with a subsidy
on afforestation and lump-sum transfers implement the first-best allocation.
The next step is to extend this model to allow for heterogeneous agents and an
OLG setup. In such a framework, the lack of information makes the decentralization
of the first best infeasible, an argument which has been often used by supporters of no
intervention. However, the real question one should ask is whether there are any Pareto
improving policies at all. The focus is then on proving the constrained inefficiency of the
competitive equilibrium which is to say that although the first best allocation cannot be
achieved, a carefully designed environmental policy can still make everybody better off.
Chapter 5
Temptation Driven Preferences and
Environmental Externalities
5.1 Introduction
The idea that agents might be tempted by immediate gratification has been the bench-
mark of the literature on self control and time inconsistent behavior. Strotz [94] was the
first one to suggest a model where the agent’s future behavior is inconsistent with his
optimal plan giving rise to a demand for pre-commitment devices. Phelps and Pollak
[79] study second best national saving when the present generation lacks the power to
commit future generations’ decisions while Laibson [62] adopts the same framework to
model time-inconsistency within an individual in the presence of an imperfect commit-
ment technology. In the same spirit, O’Donoghue and Rabin [75] explore the welfare
and behavioral implications of present biased preferences when an agent has to engage
in an activity exactly once during some length of time while O’Donoghue and Rabin
[76] extent the model to accommodate for the choice of which task to do and for partial
naivete´.
In these models of time-inconsistent preferences, there is a sequence of the con-
sumer’s different “selves” who value consumption streams in an unique way and play a
dynamic game. In contrast and following the work on preference for flexibility of Kreps
[59], Gul and Pesendorfer [46] are the first to develop a theoretical framework and ax-
iomatization for preferences over menus when agents suffer from temptation without ne-
cessitating spitting up the agent into multiple selves. In particular, they build a 2-period
decision problem where in the first period agents choose over menus of lotteries and in
the second period they choose an alternative from the chosen menu. However, agents
are subject to temptation: at the time of actual consumption, they suffer from urges
to deviate from their “commitment” preferences which prescribe what they “should” do
and instead evaluate alternatives according to their “temptation” preferences which is
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what they “want” to do. Importantly, even if they resist temptation, they will suffer
from a self-control cost. Their work is closely related to that of Dekel, Lipman and
Rustichini [28], while Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini [29] offer a natural generalization of
their representation theorem to incorporate uncertainty about future temptations and
multiple temptations. Stovall [93] deals with uncertainty regarding future temptations
too but retains the assumption that the agent is tempted only by the most tempting
alternative of a given menu. Gul and Pesendorfer [47] employ an infinite horizon model
to define and characterize dynamic self-control preferences and to study the optimality
of the equilibria attained while Noor [68, 69] extends their model to accommodate for
temptation by future consumption.
However, there are only a few applications of the above framework. Amador, Wern-
ing and Angeletos [5] study the optimal trade-off between commitment and flexibility
in a consumption-savings model where agents are subject to taste shocks while Krusell,
Kuruscu and Smith [61] study optimal taxation when consumers have temptation and
self-control problems and show that it is possible to improve utility even with a linear
tax-transfer scheme. Miao [66] analyses an agent’s decision to exercise an option under
uncertainty when he is tempted by immediate gratification and suffers from self-control
problems. Esteban, Miyagawa and Shum [37] characterize optimal non-linear pricing for
a monopoly when self-control is costly for consumers.
This paper aims to model an economy where agents, endowed with temptation
and self control preferences, take actions that create externalities for the whole society.
In particular, I will consider the problem of environmental pollution as a byproduct
of consumption. I analyze a two- period, two-countries model where in the first period
countries, represented by their decision makers, negotiate over the upper(and potentially
lower) bounds of consumption and therefore over the associated level of pollution. In the
second period, the consumers choose a level of consumption within the allowed range.
In this context and with agents experiencing different types of temptation or random
temptation, I find that it is optimal for a decision maker to commit to a singleton
set avoiding in this way temptation and the cost of self-control. Allowing for shocks
in the economy creates a trade-off between commitment and flexibility to adjust to
shocks. In this case, the optimal policy for a decision maker will depend on the range
of parameters. I find that for a relatively small shock, full commitment is favored at
the expense of no adjustment to shocks. Instead, for a relatively big shock, uncertainty
becomes too important to ignore and some degree of flexibility is optimal at the expense
of a self-control cost.
Up to now, the model has offered an insight into how a decision maker picks a
choice set to maximize exante utility taking into account the choice behavior of an
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agent at the time of actual consumption. However, his choice does nothing to correct
the externality created by aggregate consumption. Thus, the next natural step is to
discuss the social welfare implications of this model and provide a definition for social
optimality when agents are endowed with temptation preferences. The discussion would
then focus on how to internalize the cost of the externality and implement the socially
optimal allocation. A natural extension of this model is to allow for strategic interactions
between the countries. In this case, the optimal choice of a consumption set would not
only reflect the desire to reduce the self control cost associated with temptation but
also strategic considerations: it will be the optimal response to the choice set of the
other players. It would be interesting then to study whether, with the particular type of
preferences, there are Nash Equilibria other than the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma non-
cooperative outcome. The internalization of the externality cost as well as the extension
to a game setup are part of my future research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark
model and background as developed by Gul and Pesendorfer [46]. In section 3, I solve
for the competitive equilibrium and the Pareto optimal allocation in an economy where
agents have standard preferences. In section 4, I extend my analysis in order to incor-
porate agents with “temptation and self-control preferences” while allowing for shocks
in the economy. Section 5 is devoted to conclusions and further research.
5.2 The Model
My model is based on the framework first suggested by Gul and Pesendorfer [46], there-
fore we start with an analysis of their setup. The core idea of their framework is that
agents suffer from temptation: at the time of consumption, they might be tempted to
make an ex ante inferior choice. As a result, agents of this type might prefer a“restricted”
menu in the sense of removing tempting alternatives and escaping any chance of devia-
tion from their ex ante optimal behavior. Therefore, they make preferences over menus,
rather than single alternatives, the primitive of their model. They consider a two period
decision problem where in the first period agents choose over menus of lotteries while
in the second, they have to pick an alternative from the chosen menu. The two build-
ing blocks of their model is what they call a “commitment” utility and a “temptation”
utility. The “commitment” utility describes the normative preferences of an agent in
the first period: it is the utility he attaches to alternatives when he is in a “cool” state
and therefore not subject to temptation. It is also the utility he attaches to singleton
sets as in that case there is no other tempting alternative. On the other hand, the
“temptation” utility describes the agent’s “urges” in the second period: it is the utility
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he attaches to alternatives when he is in a “hot” state and tempted to pick an ex ante
inferior alternative. In this framework, the utility that the agent attaches to a menu A
is given by
U(A) = max
x∈A
[u(x) + v(x)]−max
y∈A
v(y)
where u is the “commitment” utility and v is the “ temptation” utility. Both u and v
are von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions over lotteries. The above representation
describes how an agent evaluates menus: welfare is given by the maximized value of the
sum of the commitment and the temptation utility minus the temptation utility evalu-
ated at the most tempting alternative of the menu. It also suggests a choice behavior in
the second period: given a menu A, the agent’s actual choice maximizes u(x)+v(x) while
at the same time he experiences a cost of self-control given by maxy∈A v(y). Therefore,
his second period choice behavior represents an optimal compromise between the utility
that could have been achieved under commitment and the cost of self-control.
Going back to my framework, the aim of this paper is to model an economy where
agents, endowed with temptation and self control preferences, take actions that create
externalities for the whole society. In particular, I will consider the problem of en-
vironmental pollution as a byproduct of consumption. As a benchmark, I consider a
two period economy and two countries where agents act as “decision makers” in the
first period and as “consumers” in the second period. I denote countries and their
representative agent with i where i = 1, 2. In the first period, the choice period, the
representative agent of country i, acting as a “decision maker” negotiates over the lower
and upper bounds of consumption q
i
and q¯i ∈ R+ and implicitly over the associated
level of pollution. In the second period, the consumption period, the agents acting as
“consumers” choose an actual level of consumption qi within the bounds the decision
maker has committed to. Therefore, the preferences of the decision maker are defined
over consumption intervals or choice sets, taking into account the implied second period
behavior of the agents of country i and taking as given the consumption of all the other
countries q−i. The decision maker of country i evaluates each consumption interval with
the following utility index
Ui(q¯i, q−i) =
N∑
n=1
pin
[
max
q
i
≤qi≤q¯i
[ui(qi, q−i) + vin(qi, q−i)]− max
q
i
≤qi≤q¯i
vin(qi, q−i)
]
(5.1)
where both ui and vin are strictly increasing and strictly concave and therefore ui +∑N
n=1 vin(qi, qj) is also strictly increasing and strictly concave, qi is actual consumption
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of a representative agent of country i and q−i is consumption of all other countries. This
representation of preferences, first suggested by Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini [29] and
Stovall [93] is an extension of Gul and Pesendorfer [46] which allows for uncertainty
regarding the type of temptation that can affect an agent at the time of consumption.
As before, ui represents the “commitment” utility and vin represents the “temptation”
utility associated with a temptation denoted by n, with n = 1, 2, . . . N . Therefore, in the
second period and after the decision maker has committed to a lower and upper bound
of consumption, an agent subject to random temptation evaluates alternatives according
to ui(qi, q−i) + vin(qi, q−i) with probability pin while he suffers the cost of self-control
which is given maxq
i
≤qi≤q¯i vin(qi, q−i). As implied by the representation of preferences
in (5.1), when choosing the bounds for consumption, a decision maker takes into account
this optimizing behavior of the consumers and the associated cost of self-control.
As a benchmark for my analysis, I start with an economy with agents endowed with
standard preferences and I solve for the competitive equilibrium and the Pareto optimal
allocation. Then, I move on to models where agents have “non-standard” preferences,
what we have called “temptation and self-control preferences”.
5.3 A representative agent with standard preferences
As a benchmark for our analysis, consider an economy with 2 countries and only one
consumption good: denote each country with i, where i = 1, 2. Agents have standard
preferences: they are not subject to temptation in the second period, the period of
actual consumption. Therefore, they have the same preferences in the first and the
second period, which are given by
ui(q1, q−i) = wi(qi)− φi(qi, q−i) (5.2)
where wi(qi) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, φi(qi, q−i) is strictly increasing
and convex, qi is consumption of the representative agent of country i and q−i is con-
sumption of the representative agent of the other country, with qi and q−i ∈ R+ . I will
further assume a simple linear form for φi(qi, q−i)
φi(qi, q−i) = i(qi + q−i) (5.3)
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with i > 0.
1 I will call ui the “commitment” utility function of a representative agent
of country i: it describes his preferences when he does not suffer from any temptation
or when he is in a “cool” state. The above representation of preferences implies that
there are costs associated with consumption: agents derive disutility from pollution, a
direct byproduct of consumption as described by φi. These costs could be associated
with lower environmental standards and associated health risks, reduced productivity
or even with a reduced value of the environment as a pure amenity. For any of these
reasons, agents have environmental concerns which are represented by the parameter i
and face a trade-off when they decide for the optimal level on consumption. However,
as I will show in the next section, they only take into account the effects of a lower
environmental quality on themselves, creating therefore a source of inefficiency.
1In this version of my model, I want to avoid any strategic interaction between agents, thus I employ
a linear functional form or a functional form without any interaction terms, for the cost function φ.The
case of strategic interaction in a game-theory setup becomes interesting in the presence of uncertainty
and it is the subject of my future research.
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5.3.0.1 Competitive Equilibrium and Pareto Optimality
A representative agent of country i, taking q−i as given, solves the following maximiza-
tion problem
max
qi
[wi(qi)− i(qi + q−i)] (5.4)
with
∂wi(qi)
∂qi
= i (5.5)
Then, a competitive equilibrium of this economy, is a pair (q∗1, q∗2) where q∗1 and q∗2 are
the solutions of the FOC for countries 1 and 2. As a result of the linear functional form
the externality generating function, there is no strategic interaction at this stage.
One way of solving for the Pareto optimum is to guarantee a minimum amount
of utility for agent 2 and then maximise agent 1’s utility subject to this constraint. In
other words, an allocation (qˆ1, qˆ2) is Pareto optimal if it solves
max
q1,q2
[w1(q1)− 1(q1 + q2)] (5.6)
st. w2(q2)− 2(q1 + q2) ≥ w2(qˆ2)− 2(qˆ2 + qˆ1)
Denote with λ the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint which is binding
2, so that we get the following first order conditions
∂w1(q1)
∂q1
− 1 − λ2 = 0 (5.7)
−1 + λ∂w2(q2)
∂q2
− λ2 = 0 (5.8)
or by rearranging
∂w1(q1)
∂q1
= 1 + λ2 (5.9)
∂w2(q2)
∂q2
= 2 +
1
λ
(5.10)
2 if the constraint is not binding, then we could increase the utility of agent 2 without violating the
constraint, therefore (qˆ1, qˆ2) would not be the maximizer .
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The above FOC, together with the binding constraint can be solved for the optimal
levels of consumption for agents 1 and 2 as a function of the minimum level of utility
guaranteed for agent 2. It is obvious that, given that wi(qi) is an increasing and concave
function, the Pareto optimal allocation (qˆ1, qˆ2) prescribes a lower level of consumption
than the competitive equilibrium does. This happens because the Pareto FOC take into
account the effect of each agent’s consumption level on the utility of the other agent, an
effect that the agents fail to internalize when they are acting competitively.
5.4 Uncertainty and the trade-off between commitment
and flexibility
I now assume that agents are endowed with what we have called “temptation and self-
control” preferences: in the second period, the period of actual consumption, the rep-
resentative agent suffers from temptation. In particular, I will assume that there are
two types of temptation: an agent could be “pro-business or an “environmentalist”. At
the time of actual consumption, a “pro-business” agent is tempted by consumption: he
forgets his environmental concerns and cares only about consumption. In contrast, an
“environmentalist” is affected only by his environmental concerns 3. It makes sense then
to interpret the “commitment” utility as representing the “normative” preferences of an
agent: they describe what an agent would “like” to do as opposed what he “wants” to
do at the time of actual consumption.
The choice of the “pro-business” type of temptation reflects my belief that people
often intent to do more for the environment than they actually do. Environmental
concerns are important at the start of the day when an agent is planning ahead for the
future. But when the time of actual decisions comes, consumption (or growth) takes the
lead and any environmental concerns are left aside. In the case of an uncertain state
of the economy, the model can also capture the changing objectives from the time of
the initial planning to the time of actual decision making: discussions about climate
change policies are more often when the economy is doing well but stop as soon as
there is financial instability where growth becomes the main objective. On the other
hand, I have chosen to focus on two “opposing’ temptations: a “pro business” agent
is tempted by higher consumption while an “environmentalist” by lower consumption.
In this case, social welfare analysis in an economy with both types of agents becomes
an interesting and non trivial question. Finally, this model sets the framework for the
analysis of the strategic interaction of players endowed with the particular “temptation”
3 I could assume that there exists a survival level of consumption that an “environmentalist” has to
achieve before he gives in to his environmental concerns.
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preferences and the discussion becomes even more interesting when the players have
opposing objectives as in my model. This is part of my future research on the topic.
In the next sections, I will study the case in which an agent is subject to one
type of temptation as well as the case in which he is uncertain as to which type of
temptation he might be subject to. In these cases, it will be easy to see that a “decision
maker” restricts his consumption set in a way that no self-control cost occurs at the
time of actual consumption. Then, I move on to the more interesting case where there
is uncertainly regarding the negative effect of pollution on welfare. A “decision maker”
maximizes his ex ante utility, before the resolution of uncertainty, and chooses a single
upper bound for consumption. However, there is an obvious tension between tailoring
consumption to the shock and the constant desire to give in to temptation creating a
trade-off between commitment and flexibility.
5.4.1 A pro-business agent
A “pro-business” agent is tempted by consumption: in the second period, he forgets his
environmental concerns and cares only about higher consumption. We could think of
him as an agent who would “like” to care for the environment and the long-term effects
of reduced environmental quality but he is “overwhelmed” by the opportunity of higher
consumption at the time of actual choice. Without loss of generality, the “normative”
utility of such an agent is given by
ui(q1, q−i) = log qi − i(qi + q−i)
while his “temptation” utility is given by
vBi (qi) = log qi
where q−i is the consumption of all other agents. One could think of the representative
agent of country i acting as a decision maker in the first period, who chooses lower and
upper bounds for consumption q
i
and q¯i , with his preferences over a choice set given by
Ui(qi, q¯i, q−i) = maxq
i
≤qi≤q¯i
[2 log qi − i(qi + q−i)]− max
q
i
≤qi≤q¯i
log qi (5.11)
The above representation of preferences describes how an agent evaluates lower and up-
per bounds of consumption. It is obvious that this expression suggests a choice behavior
Chapter 4. Temptation Driven Preferences and Environmental Externalities 62
in the second period: given the choice of lower and upper bounds, an agent, acting as a
consumer or “doer”, picks a level of consumption within the allowed range that maxi-
mizes [2 log(qi)− i(qi+ q−i)] while at the same time he experiences a cost of self-control
given by log(q∗i )−maxqi≤qi≤q¯i log qi. Therefore, an agent does not give in to temptation
but instead his choice behavior represents an optimal compromise between the utility
that could have been achieved under commitment and the cost of self control.
The next step is to define the preferences described by (5.11) and find an explicit
expression for the level of utility associated with the upper bound of consumption q¯i. In
the case of a pro-business agent, the lower bound has no effect on his welfare as he is
only tempted by higher consumption. I start by finding the value of the first term on the
RHS of expression (5.11), which describes the optimizing behavior of the consumer in
period 2, for any given q¯i and q−i. The agent solves the following maximization problem
max
qi≤q¯i
2 log qi − i(qi + q−i) (5.12)
with the following first order conditions
2
qi
− i − λi = 0, (5.13)
λi(qi − q¯i) = 0. (5.14)
λi ≥ 0, (5.15)
qi ≤ q¯i (5.16)
where λi is the multiplier associated with the inequality constraint for qi. Then I look
at the 2 possible cases for the value of the multiplier.
Case 1: λi = 0
In this case, we get
2
qi
= i (5.17)
which is the usual condition that the optimal level of consumption should be at the
point where the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost.
Case 2: λi > 0
In this case I get
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qBi = q¯i (5.18)
where qBi stands for the second period choice of a “pro-business” agent. Next, I find the
value of the second term on the RHS of expression (5.11). It is easy to see that if the
agent was to exercise no self-control and give in completely to his opportunistic self, he
would choose to consume exactly at the upper bound of his consumption set. Therefore,
agent i’s utility over an upper bound of consumption set is given by
Ui(q¯i, q−i) =
[
2 log(min{q¯i, 2
i
})− i(min{q¯i, 2
i
}+ q−i)− log q¯i
]
(5.19)
The next step is to find the level of upper bound that maximizes the above expres-
sion. It is easy to see that the optimal level of upper bound is exactly at the level where
the normative utility is maximized so
q¯∗Bi =
1
i
There is a straightforward intuition behind this result: an agent who suffers from tem-
pation and self-control cost would always opt to commit to a singleton set if he could.
In the case of a “pro-business” agent, commitment to an upper bound does the job:
the agent maximizes his normative preferences and does not suffer from any self-control
cost.
Shocks: The question of an optimal upper bound of consumption becomes more in-
teresting once I introduce uncertainty in the economy: with probabilities pi and 1− pi,
there can be a positive or a negative shock of size z on the coefficient related to the
negative effect of pollution which realizes at the time of actual consumption. Thus, the
coefficient is either i + zi which I call the “bad” or “+” state or i − zi which is the
“good” or “-” state, where z > 0. With uncertainty, the utility associated with a chosen
set for an agent i is given by
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Ui(qi, q¯i, q−i) = pi
[
2 log(min{q¯i, 2
(i + zi)
})− (i + zi)(min{q¯i, 2
(i + zi)
}+ q−i)− log q¯i
]
+ (1− pi)
[
2 log(min{q¯i, 2
(i − zi)})− (i − zi)(min{q¯i,
2
(i − zi)}+ q−i)− log q¯i
]
(5.20)
There is an obvious tension regarding the choice of an optimal upper bound of consump-
tion. As before, temptation induces an agent to commit to an upper bound in order
to avoid any cost. But with uncertainty, a degree of flexibility is desired in order to
adjust to any shocks. Therefore, the choice of an upper bound will inevitably involve a
trade-off between commitment and flexibility.
I now proceed with a step by step analysis for the choice of an upper bound that
maximizes the above expression.
• Case 1: q¯i ≤ 2i+zi
In this case, (5.20) becomes:
Ui(q¯i, q−i) = pi [2 log q¯i − (i + zi)(q¯i + q−i)] + (1− pi) [2 log q¯i − (i − zi)(q¯i,+q−i)]− log q¯i
= log q¯i − (i − (1− 2pi)zi)(q¯i + q−i)
The optimal value for the upper bound is given by:
q¯Bi =

1
(i−(1−2pi)zi if (i − (3− 4pi)zi > 0
2
i+zi
if (i − (3− 4pi)zi ≤ 0
• Case 2: 2
i+zi
< q¯i ≤ 2i−zi
In the same spirit, (5.20) becomes
Ui(q¯i, q−i) =pi
[
2 log
(
2
i + zi
)
− (i + zi)
(
2
i + zi
+ q−i
)]
+ (1− pi) [2 log q¯i − (i − zi)(q¯i + q−i)]− log q¯i
Chapter 4. Temptation Driven Preferences and Environmental Externalities 65
and the optimal value of q¯Bi is:
q¯Bi =

2
i+zi
if (i − (3− 4pi)zi > 0
1−2pi
(1−pi)(i−zi) if (i − (3− 4pi)zi ≤ 0
• Case 3: q¯i > 2i−zi
Ui(q¯i, q−i) =pi
[
2 log
(
2
i + zi
)
− (i + zi)
(
2
i + zi
+ q−i
)]
+ (1− pi)
[
2 log
(
2
i − zi
)
− (i − zi)
(
2
i − zi + q−i
)]
− log q¯i
which is a decreasing and convex function of q¯i so the optimal value is exactly at the
boundary
q¯Bi =
2
i − zi
Comparing the maximum value of (5.20) for each range of the upper bound, it is easy
to see that the optimal level of upper bound is:
q¯B∗i =

1
i−(1−2pi)zi if (i − (3− 4pi)zi > 0
1−2pi
(1−pi)(i−zi) if (i − (3− 4pi)zi ≤ 0
(5.21)
I sum up the results of the previous analysis in the following propositions.
Proposition 5.1. It is always true that q¯+i ≤ q¯B∗i ≤ q¯−i .
Let q¯+i and q¯
−
i be the optimal upper bounds in consumption in the bad and the good
state respectively.4 Since uncertainty regarding the state of the economy is resolved
at the time of consumption, a “decision maker” has to pick a single upper bound for
consumption that maximizes his ex ante utility as given in (5.20). Thus, for any range
of parameters, the optimal upper bound q¯B∗i is between q¯
+
i and q¯
−
i ,
1
i+zi
≤ q¯B∗i ≤ 1i−zi .
4 If there was no temptation and therefore no need to commit to an upper bound, optimal consumption
would be q¯+i =
1
i+zi
in the bad state and q¯−i =
1
i−zi in the good state. If there is no uncertainty,
optimal consumption is at 1
i
. With temptation, these become the optimal upper bounds of consumption
for each state.
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There is no benefit from choosing an upper bound outside this range. Choosing an upper
bound above q¯−i would only result to a self-control cost in the good state and higher cost
in the bad state: q¯−i is the optimal upper bound in the good state so there is no benefit
from choosing higher than that. The same logic applies for not choosing an upper bound
below q¯+i .
As pi increases, the optimal upper bound decreases and approaches the optimal
upper bound in the bad state: there is higher probability that the bad state realizes,
therefore it is optimal to commit to a lower bound of consumption. Similarly, as pi
decreases, the optimal upper bound approaches the optimal value in the good state.
Proposition 1. If (i − (3− 4pi)zi > 0, q¯B∗i = 1i−(1−2pi)zi and full commitment is op-
timal.
For the specified range of parameters, 1i+zi ≤ q¯B∗i < 2i+zi < 2i−zi and the agent is
constrained to consume at the upper bound in both states. The logic behind this result
is the following. At the time of actual consumption, uncertainty is resolved and the
agent finds himself in one of the two states. Since the upper bound has already been
fixed, the agent picks a level of consumption within the allowed range to maximize u+v
while at the same time he experiences a cost of self-control. If the bad state realizes,
the agent would like to consume 2i+zi but he is constrained by the upper bound, so
he consumes exactly q¯B∗i and incurs no self control cost. Similarly, if the good state
realizes, the agent would like to consume 2i−zi but he is again constrained and consumes
q¯B∗i . In other words, the shock zi is relatively small in comparison to the cost of self
control from resisting temptation, hence it becomes optimal to restrict the choice set of
the agent so that he consumes exactly at the boundary in both states. Therefore, with
full commitment, the agent avoids completely temptation and the cost associated with
it at the expense of the flexibility to respond to shocks in the economy.
Corollary 1.1. If pi ≥ 12 and/or i ≥ 3zi, then commitment is always optimal.
The proof follows directly from the above proposition.
Corollary 1.2. If pi >
1
2 , then q¯
B∗
i <
1
i
and if pi <
1
2 , then q¯
B∗
i >
1
i
. For pi =
1
2 ,
q¯B∗i =
1
i
The intuition behind this result is very clear: if the good(bad) state is more probable
than the bad(good) state , then more weight is given to the good(bad) state and therefore
the optimal upper bound is closer to q¯−i (q¯
+
i ). For equally probable states, the optimal
upper bound is set at 1i . the optimal upper bound in the case of no uncertainty.
Corollary 1.3. As pi decreases, the optimal upper bound increases.
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As discussed earlier, when the good state becomes more probable, the optimal upper
bound q¯B∗i increases and approaches q¯
−
i . If i ≥ 3zi, then commitment is always opti-
mal and the optimal upper bound can increase up to q¯−i taking into account the high
probability of the good state but will never lead to the case of flexibility: commitment is
always optimal and the agent will always be constrained and consume at the boundary
in both states.
If on the other hand, i < 3zi, then commitment is not always optimal. For low
enough probability of the bad state, the optimal upper bound could increase up and
above 2i+zi (the upper bound for the case of commitment) leading the way to a more
flexible treatment of the shocks.
Corollary 1.4. The optimal upper bound q¯∗Bi decreases with the size of the shock when
pi ≥ 12 and increases when pi < 12 .
As discussed earlier, when pi ≥ 12 , commitment is always optimal and q¯∗Bi ≤ 1i . As
the shock gets bigger, the optimal upper bound decreases and moves towards q¯+i , the
optimal bound at the more probable bad state. Instead as the shock becomes smaller,
q¯∗Bi increases and moves towards
1
i
, the optimal bound when there is no uncertainty. If
on the other hand, pi <
1
2 but i ≥ 3zi, then commitment is once again always optimal
and q¯∗Bi >
1
i
. When the size of the shock decreases, the optimal upper bound decreases
and moves towards 1i while as the shock increases, q¯
∗B
i increases and approaches q¯
−
i ,
the optimal upper bound in the more probable good state. Instead, if i < 3zi, then
commitment is not always optimal and as the shock increases, the optimal upper bound
increases up and above 2i+zi leading the way to more flexibility. Therefore, for relatively
low probabilities of the bad state and big shocks, the agent’s preference for flexibility
increases while for relatively high probability of the bad state and bigger shocks, the
agents prefer an even stricter commitment policy.
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Proposition 2. If (i − (3− 4pi)zi ≤ 0, q¯B∗i = 1−2pi(1−pi)(i−zi) and some degree of flexibility
is optimal.
In this case, 2i+zi ≤ q¯B∗i ≤ 1i−zi < 2i−zi and the agent has some degree of flexibility
to adjust to the good state. If the bad state realizes, the agent, who maximizes u + v,
finds it optimal to consume at 2i+zi , which is now within his choice set. At the same
time, he experiences a cost of self-control from resisting temptation which is given by
log 2i+zi − log q¯B∗i . Instead, if the good state realizes, the agent is still constrained by
the upper bound but q¯B∗i is now higher than in the case of commitment. Therefore,
we see that for a big enough shock, uncertainty becomes important and some degree of
flexibility is optimal. However, flexibility comes with a cost, as now the agent is subject
to temptation and he faces a self control cost if the bad state realizes. Therefore, the
agent will incur a self control cost only in the bad state as a trade off for the flexibility
to consume more in the good state.
Corollary 2.1. As pi decreases(increases), the optimal upper bound increases(decreases).
As pi decreases, it becomes more likely that an agent will face the good state
and thus, more flexibility is desired: q¯∗Bi increases and moves towards q¯
−
i . Instead, as
pi increases, q¯
∗B
i decreases and approaches
2
i+zi
. The idea is that as the bad state
is becoming more probable, it is more likely to face the cost associated with resisting
temptation so the agents prefer less flexibility and a lower upper bound so that they
reduce the cost of self-control.
Corollary 2.2. As zi increases(decreases), q¯
∗B
i increases(decreases).
As the shock becomes bigger, the agent prefers more flexibility in order to adjust
to uncertainty and to the high optimal consumption of the good state. However, the
optimal upper bound will never exceed q¯−i : normative preferences in the good state are
maximized exactly at this point so allowing for higher consumption will only bring a self
control cost. If the size of the shock decreases, uncertainty becomes less important and
less flexibility is desired: the optimal upper bound decreases and moves towards 2i+zi ,
decreasing the cost of self-control.
5.4.2 An “environmentalist” agent
Within the same framework, I now allow for the agent to suffer from the second type
of temptation: at the time of actual consumption, his “ environmentalist” self kicks in,
who cares only about the environment. It would be more intuitive perhaps to think of
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this kind of temptation as a “ regret” that the agent feels for not being able to care
more for the environment. Let the “temptation” preferences be represented by:
vEi (qi.q−i) = −i(qi + q−i)
while his utility over the chosen set is given by:
Ui(qi, q¯i, q−i) = maxq
i
≤qi≤q¯i
[log qi − 2i(qi + q−i)]− max
q
i
≤qi≤q¯i
[−i(qi + q−i)]
Since an environmentalist agent is only tempted to consume less that his normative
preferences imply, the upper bound of consumption has no effect on welfare. Therefore,
the above expression can be written as:
Ui(qi, q−i) =
[
log(max{q
i
,
1
2i
})− 2i
(
max{q
i
,
1
2i
}+ q−i
)
+ i
(
q
i
+ q−i
)]
It is easy to see that similarly to the case of a pro-business agent and no shocks, the opti-
mal level of lower bound is exactly at the level where the normative utility is maximized
so
q∗E
i
=
1
i
in which case all temptation dissapears and there is no cost of self-control.
Shocks: For the case of shocks, utility over the chosen set is given by the following
expression
Ui(qi, q−i) =pi
[
log(max{q
i
,
1
2(i + zi)
})− 2(i + zi)
(
max{q
i
,
1
2(i + zi)
}+ q−i
)]
+ (1− pi)
[
log(max{q
i
,
1
2(i − zi)})− 2(i − zi)
(
max{q
i
,
1
2(i − zi)}+ q−i
)]
+ (i − (1− 2pi)zi)
(
q
i
+ q−i
)
(5.22)
The next step is to find the level of lower bound that maximizes the above expression.
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• Case 1: q
i
≤ 1
2(i+zi)
Ui(qi, q−i) =pi
[
log
(
1
2(i + zi)
)
− 1− 2(i + zi)q−i
]
+ (1− pi)
[
log
(
1
2(i − zi)
)
− 1− 2(i − zi)q−i
]
+ (i − (1− 2pi)zi)
(
q
i
+ q−i
)
which is increasing in q
i
, so the optimal value is exactly at the boundary:
qE
i
=
1
2(i + zi)
• Case 2: 1
2(i+zi)
< q
i
≤ 1
2(i−zi)
Ui(qi, q−i) =pi
[
log q
i
− 2(i + zi)(qi + q−i)
]
+ (1− pi)
[
log
(
1
2(i − zi)
)
− 1− 2(i − zi)q−i
]
+ (i − (1− 2pi)zi)
(
q
i
+ q−i
)
and the optimal value for the lower bound is:
q¯Ei =

pi
(zi−i(1−2pi)) if (i − (1 + 2pi)zi ≤ 0
1
2(i−zi) if (i − (1 + 2pi)zi > 0
• Case 3: q
i
> 1
2(i−zi)
Ui(qi, q−i) =pi
[
log q
i
− 2(i + zi)(qi + q−i)
]
+ (1− pi)
[
log q
i
− 2(i − zi)(qi + q−i)
]
]
+ (i − (1− 2pi)zi)
(
q
i
+ q−i
)
and the above expression is maximized at:
q¯Ei =

1
2(i−zi) if (i − (1 + 2pi)zi ≤ 0
1
(ei−zi(1−2pi)) if (i − (1 + 2pi)zi > 0
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Comparing the maximum value of (5.22) for each range of the lower bound, it is
easy to see that the optimal level of lower bound is:
q¯Ei =

pi
(zi−i(1−2pi)) if (i − (1 + 2pi)zi ≤ 0
1
(i−zi(1−2pi)) if (i − (1 + 2pi)zi > 0
As before, the results are summarized in the following propositions.
Proposition 3. If (i − (1 + 2pi))zi > 0, q¯E∗i = 1(i−zi(1−2pi)) and full commitment is
optimal.
In this case, 12(i+zi) <
1
2(i−zi) < q¯
E∗
i ≤ 1i+zi and the agent is constrained to consume at
the boundary in both states. If the bad state realizes, the agent would like to consume
at 12(i+zi) but he is constrained by the lower bound and consumes exactly at q¯
E∗
i and
incurs no-self control cost. Similarly, if the good state realizes, he is again constrained by
the lower bound and consumes at q¯E∗i . The same logic as in the case of a “pro-business”
agent applies here: the shock is not strong enough so the decision maker opts for full
commitment at the expense of flexibility to respond to shocks.
The same corollaries as in the case of a “pro-business” agent are true in the case of an
“environmentalist” .
Corollary 3.1. As pi decreases, the optimal lower bound increases.
As pi increases, q¯
E∗
i decreases and moves towards
1
2(i−zi) leading the way for a more
flexible treatment of shocks.
Corollary 3.2. The optimal lower bound q¯E∗i decreases with the size of the shock when
pi ≥ 12 and increases when pi < 12 .
In other words, for relatively high probabilities of the bad state and big shocks the
agent’s preference for flexibility increases, and the optimal lower bound decreases while
for relatively low probability of the bad state and bigger shocks, the agents prefer an
even stricter commitment policy and the optimal lower bound increases.
Proposition 4. If (i − (1 + 2pi))zi ≤ 0, q¯E∗i = pi(zi−i(1−2pi)) and some degree of flexi-
bility is optimal.
In this case 12(i+zi) <
1
i+zi
≤ q¯E∗i ≤ 12(i−zi) , and some degree of flexibility is optimal.
If the good state realizes, the agent, who maximizes u+ v, finds it optimal to consume
at 12(i−zi) which is now within his choice set. At the same time, he experiences a cost
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of self-control from resisting temptation which is given by −i
(
1
2(i−zi)
)
+ iq¯
E∗
i . If the
bad state realizes, the agents is still constrained and consumers at q¯E∗i but the optimal
lower bound is now lower than in the commitment case allowing for some flexibility to
adjust to the low optimal consumption in the bad state. In other words, the shock is big
enough to induce some degree of flexibility at the expense of allowing temptation and
the associated self-control cost. In contrast with the case of a “pro-business” agent, it
is the bad state that is now restricted and the self control cost occurs only in the good
state as its source is the “regret” from having consumed too much.
Corollary 4.1. As pi decreases(increases), the optimal lower bound increases(decreases).
Similarly to the case of a “pro-business” agent, as pi decreases, the optimal lower bound
increases: as the good state becomes more probable, it is more likely to face the self-
control cost associated with the good state. Thus, the optimal lower bound increases so
that the cost of self-control decreases.
Corollary 4.2. As zi increases(decreases), q¯
∗E
i decreases(increases).
As the the shock gets bigger, the agent prefers more flexibility to adjust to the low
optimal consumption the bad state. The optimal lower bound decreases up to q¯+i but
never below as this is where the normative preferences are maximized in the bad state.
As the shock gets smaller, uncertainty becomes less important and less flexibility is
desired: the optimal lower bound increases and moves towards 12(i−zi) decreasing the
cost of self-control.
5.5 Conclusions and Further Research
I have shown that in an economy where agents are endowed with “temptation and self-
control preferences”, there is an apparent optimal policy intervention. In particular, I
assume that there are two types of agents: a “pro-business” agent who, at the period
of consumption, forgets all his environmental concerns and is tempted by higher con-
sumption. And an “environmentalist” agent who is tempted to care only about the
environment. I view the agent in period 1 as a “decision maker” with his preferences
described by a “commitment” utility and I allow him to commit to lower and upper
bounds of consumption. It is immediate that in an economy where the only source of
uncertainty is the type of temptation an agent might be subject to, it is optimal to com-
mit to a singleton set exactly at the point where “commitment” utility is maximized.
One could say that all the inefficiency resulting from this particular type of preferences
is being corrected: all temptation is being removed and there is no cost of self-control.
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However, one should not forget that in the economy of this model, there are externalities:
agents fail to internalize the negative effect of their consumption on the welfare of the
rest of the society. In this respect, the decision maker does nothing to correct this type
of inefficiency. In an economy without any shocks, it is apparent that a “social planner”
whose objective is to maximize the aggregate welfare of the 2 countries could simply
commit to the Pareto efficient level consumption. But even if this ‘invading” policy
intervention is realistic, it becomes a non trivial problem to find the optimal bounds of
consumption when there are shocks in the economy.
The question of optimal lower and upper bounds of consumption becomes more
interesting once I introduce uncertainty in the economy: with probabilities pi and 1−pi,
there can be a negative or a positive shock of size z on the coefficient related to the
negative effect of pollution. In this case, there is an obvious tension regarding the choice
of optimal lower and upper bounds of consumption. Temptation induces an agent to
commit to a singleton set in order to avoid any cost. But with uncertainty, a degree of
flexibility is desired in order to adjust to any shocks. Therefore, the choice of lower and
upper bounds will inevitably involve a trade-off between commitment and flexibility. I
show that depending on a condition on the range of parameters, the optimal policy could
call for full commitment or some degree of flexibility. For relatively small values of the
shock, it becomes optimal to restrict the choice set of the agent so that he consumes
exactly at the boundary in both states. In fact, the “commitment” level of consumption
is below what he would optimally consume in the good or in the bad state if he was “pro-
business” and above if he was “environmentalist”. In a way, the presence of uncertainty
makes the decision maker “overreact” in fear of giving in to temptation in the period
of actual consumption. With full commitment, the agent avoids completely temptation
and the cost associated with it at the expense of the flexibility to respond to shocks in the
economy. Instead, for a big enough shock, some degree of flexibility is optimal. However,
flexibility comes with the cost, as now the agent is subject to temptation and he faces a
self control cost. For this reason, if the agent is “pro-business” (environmentalist), it is
optimal to allow only for the optimal level of consumption in the bad (good) state but
to restrict the agent from consuming optimally in the good (bad) state. With shocks,
the question of a Pareto efficient allocation does not have a straightforward answer. In
some cases, the commitment level described above can lead to a Pareto improvement
while in others to a Pareto impairment, calling for a more complex design of the optimal
intervention.
The question becomes trickier if in an economy with shocks, uncertainty regarding
the type of temptation is allowed. One could think of this as an economy with a contin-
uum of agents, where with probabilities pi and 1− pi, an agent could be “pro-business”
or “environmentalist”. In this case a decision maker has to optimally commit to a
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consumption set taking into account how the lower bound will affect the welfare of an
“environmentalist” and how the upper bound will affect a “pro-business”. This case as
well as the analysis of Pareto improving policies while allowing for strategic interactions
between the countries are topics for my future research.
Annexes
Appendix A
Chapter 3: Proofs of lemmas for a two state
economy
Lemma 1: There is a almost always a Pareto improving policy.
Proof: Recalling equation (3.37), it suffices to show that
I∑
i=1
ui,1(ci,1)−
I∑
i=1
ui,2(ci,2) 6= 0
generically in the space of endowments.
I start by defining the following function
F(c1, c2, λ1, λ2, e1, e2) =

∂u0,1(c0,1)
∂c0,1
− λ1
∂u1,1(c1,1)
∂c1,1
− λ1
...
∂uI,1(cI,1)
∂c1,I
− λ1
I∑
i=0
ei,1 −
I∑
i=0
ci,1∑I
i=1 ui,1(ci,1)−
∑I
i=1 ui,2(ci,2)
∂u0,2(c0,2)
∂c0,2
− λ2
∂u1,2(c1,2)
∂c1,2
− λ2
...
∂uI,2(cI,2)
∂cI,2
− λ2
I∑
i=0
ei,2 −
I∑
i=0
ci,2

(A.1)
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Appendix A. 2
which includes the FOC for Pareto optimal allocations and the resource constraints for
each state in period 1 and the condition
∑I
i=1 ui,1(ci,1)−
∑I
i=1 ui,2(ci,2)
1. Then, a Pareto
optimal allocation for the economy (e, u) is a 4-tuple (c1, c2, λ1, λ2) such that all rows
of F other than
∑I
i=1 ui,1(ci,1)−
∑I
i=1 ui,2(ci,2), are equal to 0. With arguments in the
order
(c0,1, . . . , cI,1, e0,1, λ1, c0,2, . . . , cI,2, λ2, e1,1, . . . , eI,1, e0,2, . . . , eI,2),
the Jacobian around the Pareto optimal allocation at each state isDF(c1, c2, λ1, λ2, e1, e2)
1Note that, since in our model all the inefficiency comes from the choice of effort in period 0, it
suffices to look only at the social planner’s problem of period 1.
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Appendix A. 4
We now argue that this 2(I + 1) + 3× 4(I + 1) + 2 matrix has full rank in four steps.
Step 1: Consider the submatrix without the last 2I + 1 columns, which we denote with
H and get the partitions of this submatrix as
∂2u0,1(cˆ0,1)
∂c20,1
· · · 0 0 −1 0 · · · 0 0
0 · · · 0 0 −1 0 · · · 0 0
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 · · · ∂2uI,1(cˆI,1)
∂c2I,1
0 −1 0 · · · 0 0
−1 · · · −1 1 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 · · · ∂uI,1(cˆI,1)∂cI,1 0 0 0 · · ·
∂uI,2(cˆI,2)
∂cI,2
0
0 · · · 0 0 0 ∂2u0,2(cˆ0,2)
∂c20,2
· · · 0 −1
0 · · · 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 −1
...
. . .
...
...
...
... · · · ... ...
0 · · · 0 0 0 0 · · · ∂2uI,2(cˆI,2)
∂c2I,2
−1
0 · · · 0 0 0 −1 · · · −1 0
(A.3)
Step 2: We will show that the top left (I + 3× I + 3) submatrix H11, has full row rank.
First notice that by strong concavity, the submatrix without the last row has full row
rank. Then, for H11 to have full row rank, it suffices to show that there exists a column
vector α ∈ RI+3 such that H11α = (0 v)T where u is a scalar. It is easy to see that this
is true for
α =

1
∂2u0,1(cˆ0,1)
∂c20,1
1
∂2u1,1(cˆ1,1)
∂c21,1
...
1
∂2uI,1(cˆI,1)
∂c2
I,1
I∑
i=0
1
∂2ui,1(cˆi,1)
∂c2i,1
1

Then H11α is 0 everywhere, except from the last row where it is
I∑
i=1
∂ui,1(cˆi,1)
∂ci,1
∂2ui,1(cˆi,1)
∂c2i,1
6= 0. So
H11 has full row rank.
Step 3: Noting that H11 is invertible, H21 is a zero matrix and H22 has full row rank
Appendix A. 5
(by strong concavity) and that |H| = |H11||H22−H21H−111 H12|, we conclude that H has
full row rank.
Step 4: Finally, adding the last 2I + 1 columns the row rank of the matrix will not
change, so DF(c1, c2, λ1, λ2, e1, e2) has full row rank.
Now, since DF(c1, c2, λ1, λ2, e1, e2) has full row rank, F(c1, c2, λ1, λ2, e1, e2) is t
0. Then, the set of endowments at which F(·, e1, e2) t 0 has full measure. Since
DF(·, e1, e2) has one fewer column than rows, F(·, e1, e2) t 0 implies that, whenever all
conditions for Pareto optimality are true, it is also true that(∑I
i=1 ui,1(cˆi,1)−
∑I
i=1 ui,2(cˆi,2)
)
6= 0.
This concludes the proof.
Appendix B
Chapter 3: Model with S ≥ 2
I present an alternative model where there is a finite number of states in period 1
denoted by s, with s = 1, . . . , S. I denote the probability of each state with pis() where∑S
s=1 pis() = 1 and
∑S
s=1 pi
′
s() = 0 and  is the level of effort exerted by agent 0. I
assume that there are at least two states s′ and s′′ for which pi′s′() = −pi′s′′() 6= 0 and
without loss of generality, let s′ = 1.
As before, the FOC for an agent i are
qs = pi()
∂ui,s
∂ci,s
(ei,s + θi,s) (B.1)
while for agent 0 there is one more condition for the optimality of the level of effort
given by
S∑
s=1
pi′s()(u0,s(e0,s + θ0,s) = 1 (B.2)
The social welfare function is given by
SW = −+
S∑
s=1
(
pis()
I∑
i=1
(ui,s(ci,s) + u0,s(c0,s))
)
(B.3)
and as before I consider a perturbation of the asset holdings of agent 0 (dθ01, . . . , dθ0S)
with the following welfare implications
dSW =− d+
S∑
s=1
(
pi′s()
I∑
i=1
(ui,s(ci,s) + u0,s(c0,s))
)
d
+
S∑
s=1
(
pis()
I∑
i=1
(
∂ui,s(ci,s)
∂ci,s
dci,s +
∂u0,s(cˆ0,s)
∂c0,s
dc0,s
))
(B.4)
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which can me simplified to
dSW = d
S∑
s=1
(
pi′s()
I∑
i=1
ui,s(ci,s)
)
(B.5)
where
d = −
∑S
s=1
(
pi′s()
∂u0,s
∂c0,s
(e0,s + θ0,s)dc0,s
)
∑S
s=1 (pi
′′
s ()u0,s(e0,s + θ0,s))
(B.6)
The direction of the welfare improving policy depends on the sign of∑S
s=1
(
pi′s()
∑I
i=1 ui,s(ci,s)
)
.
For a positive value. the equilibrium level of effort is inefficiently low while for a negative
value, it is inefficiently high. It is not clear though, which is the exact direction of the
perturbation policy as we need more assumptions regarding the sign of (B.6). However,
it is easy to show that there exists a Pareto improving policy almost always. We follow
the same method as in the case of only two states. Consider the function
G(c1 . . . cs, λ1, . . . λs, e1 . . . , es) =

∂u0,1(c0,1)
∂c0,1
− λ1
∂u1,1(c1,1)
∂c1,1
− λ1
...
∂uI,1(cI,1)
∂c1,I
− λ1
I∑
i=0
ei,1 −
I∑
i=0
ci,1∑S
s=1
(
pi′s()
∑I
i=1 ui,s(ci,s)
)
...
∂u0,S(c0,S)
∂c0,S
− λS
∂u1,S(c1,S)
∂c1,S
− λS
...
∂uI,S(cI,S)
∂cI,S
− λS
I∑
i=0
ei,S −
I∑
i=0
ci,S

(B.7)
With arguments in the order
(c0,1, . . . , cI,1, e0,1, λ1, . . . , c0,S , . . . , cI,S , λS , e1,1, . . . , eI,1, . . . , e0,S , . . . , eI,S), the Jacobian
Appendix B. 8
around the Pareto optimal allocation in each state is given byDG(c1, . . . , cS , λ1, . . . , λS , e1, . . . , eS)
is
Appendix B. 9
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We now argue that this S(I + 1) +S+ 1× 2S(I + 1) +S has full row rank following the
same method as in the case of just 2 states.
Step 1: Consider the submatrix without the last S(I + 1)− 1 columns which we denote
with K and get the partitions of the submatrix as
Appendix B. 11
∂
2
u
0
,1
(cˆ
0
,1
)
∂
c2 0
,1
0
··
·
0
0
−1
··
·
0
0
··
·
0
0
0
∂
2
u
1
,1
(cˆ
1
,1
)
∂
c2 1
,1
··
·
0
0
−1
··
·
0
0
··
·
0
0
. . .
. . .
. .
.
. . .
. . .
. . .
. .
.
. . .
. . .
. .
.
. . .
. . .
0
0
··
·
∂
2
u
i,
1
(cˆ
I
,1
)
∂
c2 I
,1
0
−1
··
·
0
0
··
·
0
0
−1
−1
··
·
−1
1
0
··
·
0
0
··
·
0
0
0
pi
′ 1(
)
∂
u
1
,1
(cˆ
1
,1
)
∂
c 1
,1
··
·
pi
′ 1(
)
∂
u
I
,1
(cˆ
I
,1
)
∂
c I
,1
0
0
··
·
0
pi
′ S(
)
∂
u
1
,S
(cˆ
1
,S
)
∂
c 1
,S
··
·
pi
′ S(
)
∂
u
I
,S
(cˆ
I
,S
)
∂
c I
,S
0
. . .
. . .
. .
.
. . .
. . .
. . .
. .
.
. . .
. . .
. .
.
. . .
. . .
0
0
··
·
0
0
0
··
·
∂
2
u
0
,2
(cˆ
0
,2
)
∂
c2 0
,2
0
··
·
0
−1
0
0
··
·
0
0
0
··
·
0
∂
2
u
1
,S
(cˆ
1
,S
)
∂
c2 1
,S
··
·
0
−1
. . .
. . .
. .
.
. . .
. . .
. . .
. .
.
. . .
. . .
. .
.
. . .
. . .
0
0
··
·
0
0
0
··
·
0
0
··
·
∂
2
u
I
,S
(cˆ
i,
S
)
∂
c2 I
,S
−1
0
0
··
·
0
0
0
··
·
−1
−1
··
·
−1
0
(B
.9
)
Appendix B. 12
Step 2: We will show that the top left (I + 3× I + 3) submatrix K11, has full row rank.
First notice that by strong concavity, the submatrix without the last row has full row
rank. Then, for K11 to have full row rank, it suffices to show that there exists a column
vector β ∈ RI+3 such that K11β = (0 w)T where w is a scalar. It is easy to see that this
is true for
α =

1
∂2u0,1(cˆ0,1)
∂c20,1
1
∂2u1,1(cˆ1,1)
∂c21,1
...
1
∂2uI,1(cˆI,1)
∂c2
I,1
I∑
i=0
1
∂2ui,1(cˆi,1)
∂c2i,1
1

Then K11β is 0 everywhere, except from the last row where it is pi′1()
I∑
i=1
∂ui,1(cˆi,1)
∂ci,1
∂2ui,1(cˆi,1)
∂c2i,1
6= 0.
So K11 has full row rank.
Step 3: Noting that K11 is invertible, K21 is a zero matrix and K22 has full row rank
(by strong concavity) and that |K| = |K11||K22 − K21K−111 K12|, we conclude that K has
full row rank.
Step 4: Finally, adding the last 2S(I + 1) − 1 columns the row rank of the matrix will
not change, so DG(c1, . . . , cS , λ1, . . . , λS , e1, . . . , eS) has full row rank.
SinceDG(c1, . . . , cS , λ1, . . . , λS , e1, . . . , eS) has full row rank, G(c1 . . . cs, λ1, . . . λs, e1 . . . , es)
is t 0. Then, the set of endowments at which G(·, e1, . . . , eS) t 0 has full mea-
sure. Since DG(·, e1, . . . , eS) has one fewer column than rows, G(·, e1, . . . , eS) t 0 im-
plies that, whenever all conditions for Pareto optimality are true, it is also true that∑S
s=1
(
pi′s()
∑I
i=1 ui,s(ci,s)
)
6= 0. This concludes the proof.
Bibliography
[1] F. Ackerman, E. A. Stanton, and R. Bueno. Fat tails, exponents, extreme un-
certainty: Simulating catastrophe in dice. Ecological Economics, 69(8):1657–1665,
2010.
[2] D. S. Ahn and T. Sarver. Preference for flexibility and random choice. Economet-
rica, 81(1):341–361, 2013.
[3] F. Allen and D. Gale. Optimal security design. Review of Financial Studies,
1(3):229–263, 1988.
[4] F. Allen and D. Gale. Arbitrage, short sales, and financial innovation. Economet-
rica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 1041–1068, 1991.
[5] M. Amador, I. Werning, and G.-M. Angeletos. Commitment vs. flexibility. Econo-
metrica, 74(2):365–396, 2006.
[6] R. Arnott and J. Stiglitz. Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets with
moral hazard. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1991.
[7] A. Baranzini, M. Chesney, and J. Morisset. The impact of possible climate catas-
trophes on global warming policy. Energy Policy, 31(8):691–701, 2003.
[8] S. D. Baum. Description, prescription and the choice of discount rates. Ecological
Economics, 69(1):197–205, 2009.
[9] B. D. Bernheim and A. Rangel. Behavioral public economics: Welfare and policy
analysis with non-standard decision-makers. Technical report, National Bureau of
Economic Research, 2005.
[10] A. Bisin. General equilibrium with endogenously incomplete financial markets.
Journal of Economic Theory, 82(1):19–45, 1998.
[11] A. Bisin and D. Guaitoli. Moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts. RAND Journal
of Economics, pages 306–328, 2004.
13
Bibliography 14
[12] A. L. Bovenberg and R. A. De Mooij. Environmental levies and distortionary
taxation. The American Economic Review, 84(4):1085–1089, 1994.
[13] A. L. Bovenberg and F. van der Ploeg. Environmental policy, public finance and
the labour market in a second-best world. Journal of Public Economics, 55(3):349–
390, 1994.
[14] L. H. Braido. General equilibrium with endogenous securities and moral hazard.
Economic Theory, 26(1):85–101, 2005.
[15] Y. Cai, K. Judd, and T. Lontzek. Dsice: a dynamic stochastic integrated model
of climate and economy. 2012.
[16] A. Carvajal and H. Polemarchakis. Idiosyncratic risk and financial policy. Journal
of Economic Theory, 146(4):1569–1597, 2011.
[17] A. Carvajal, M. Rostek, and M. Weretka. Competition in financial innovation.
Econometrica, 80(5):1895–1936, 2012.
[18] D. Cass and A. Citanna. Pareto improving financial innovation in incomplete
markets. Economic Theory, 11(3):467–494, 1998.
[19] D. Cass, P. Siconolfi, and A. Villanacci. Generic regularity of competitive equilibria
with restricted participation. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 36(1):61–76,
2001.
[20] Z. Chen. Financial innovation and arbitrage pricing in frictional economies. Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, 65(1):117–135, 1995.
[21] A. Citanna, A. Kajii, and A. Villanacci. Constrained suboptimality in incomplete
markets: a general approach and two applications. Economic Theory, 11(3):495–
521, 1998.
[22] A. Citanna, H. M. Polemarchakis, and M. Tirelli. The taxation of trades in assets.
Journal of Economic Theory, 126(1):299–313, 2006.
[23] W. R. Cline. The economics of global warming. Peterson Institute, 1992.
[24] H. Cremer, F. Gahvari, and N. Ladoux. Externalities and optimal taxation. Jour-
nal of Public Economics, 70(3):343–364, 1998.
[25] H. Cremer, F. Gahvari, and N. Ladoux. Second-best pollution taxes and the
structure of preferences. Southern Economic Journal, pages 258–280, 2001.
[26] P. Dasgupta. Human well-being and the natural environment. OUP Catalogue,
2001.
Bibliography 15
[27] P. Dasgupta, K.-G. Ma¨ler, and S. Barrett. Intergenerational equity, social discount
rates, and global warming. Discounting and intergenerational equity, 51:53, 1999.
[28] E. Dekel, B. L. Lipman, and A. Rustichini. Representing preferences with a unique
subjective state space. Econometrica, 69(4):891–934, 2001.
[29] E. Dekel, B. L. Lipman, and A. Rustichini. Temptation-driven preferences. The
Review of Economic Studies, 76(3):937–971, 2009.
[30] M. Dell, B. F. Jones, and B. A. Olken. Temperature shocks and economic growth:
Evidence from the last half century. American Economic Journal: Macroeco-
nomics, 4(3):66–95, 2012.
[31] S. DellaVigna and U. Malmendier. Contract design and self-control: Theory and
evidence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(2):353–402, 2004.
[32] S. Dietz and N. Stern. Why economic analysis supports strong action on climate
change: a response to the stern review’s critics. Review of Environmental Eco-
nomics and Policy, 2(1):94–113, 2008.
[33] D. Duffie and R. Rahi. Financial market innovation and security design: An
introduction. Journal of Economic Theory, 65(1):1–42, 1995.
[34] J. Eberl and D. Jus. The year of the cat: Taxing nuclear risk with the help of
capital markets. Energy Policy, 51:364–373, 2012.
[35] R. Elul. Welfare effects of financial innovation in incomplete markets economies
with several consumption goods. Journal of Economic Theory, 65(1):43–78, 1995.
[36] R. Elul. Welfare-improving financial innovation with a single good. Economic
Theory, 13(1):25–40, 1999.
[37] S. Esteban, E. Miyagawa, and M. Shum. Nonlinear pricing with self-control pref-
erences. Journal of Economic Theory, 135(1):306–338, 2007.
[38] S. Fankhauser and R. SJ Tol. On climate change and economic growth. Resource
and Energy Economics, 27(1):1–17, 2005.
[39] S. Frederick, G. Loewenstein, and T. O’donoghue. Time discounting and time
preference: A critical review. Journal of economic literature, 40(2):351–401, 2002.
[40] J. Geanakoplos and H. Polemarchakis. Pareto improving taxes. Journal of Math-
ematical Economics, 44(7):682–696, 2008.
Bibliography 16
[41] J. Geanakoplos and H. M. Polemarchakis. Existence, regularity and constrained
suboptimality of competitive allocations when the asset market is incomplete.
Uncertainty, information and communication: essays in honor of KJ Arrow, 3:65–
96, 1986.
[42] E. L. Gime´nez. Complete and incomplete markets with short-sale constraints.
Economic Theory, 21(1):195–204, 2003.
[43] M. Gori, M. Pireddu, and A. Villanacci. Regularity and pareto improving on
financial equilibria with price-dependent borrowing restrictions. Research in Eco-
nomics, 2012.
[44] B. C. Greenwald and J. E. Stiglitz. Externalities in economies with imperfect
information and incomplete markets. The quarterly journal of economics, pages
229–264, 1986.
[45] S. J. Grossman and O. D. Hart. An analysis of the principal-agent problem.
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 7–45, 1983.
[46] F. Gul and W. Pesendorfer. Temptation and self-control. Econometrica,
69(6):1403–1435, 2001.
[47] F. Gul and W. Pesendorfer. Self-control and the theory of consumption. Econo-
metrica, 72(1):119–158, 2004.
[48] F. Gul and W. Pesendorfer. Self-control, revealed preference and consumption
choice. Review of Economic Dynamics, 7(2):243–264, 2004.
[49] W. M. Hanemann. Valuing the environment through contingent valuation. The
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(4):19–43, 1994.
[50] O. D. Hart. On the optimality of equilibrium when the market structure is incom-
plete. Journal of Economic Theory, 11(3):418–443, 1975.
[51] E. Helpman and J.-J. Laffont. On moral hazard in general equilibrium theory.
Journal of Economic Theory, 10(1):8–23, 1975.
[52] M. Hoel and T. Sterner. Discounting and relative prices. Climatic Change, 84(3-
4):265–280, 2007.
[53] C. Hope. The marginal impact of co2 from page2002: An integrated assessment
model incorporating the ipcc’s five reasons for concern. Integrated assessment,
6(1), 2006.
[54] C. Hope, J. Anderson, and P. Wenman. Policy analysis of the greenhouse effect:
An application of the page model. Energy Policy, 21(3):327–338, 1993.
Bibliography 17
[55] C. M. Kahn and D. Mookherjee. Competition and incentives with nonexclusive
contracts. The Rand Journal of Economics, pages 443–465, 1998.
[56] T. C. Koopmans. Stationary ordinal utility and impatience. Econometrica: Jour-
nal of the Econometric Society, pages 287–309, 1960.
[57] T. C. Koopmans. Representation of preference orderings over time. Decision and
organization, pages 79–100, 1972.
[58] R. Kopp, A. Golub, N. Keohane, and C. Onda. The influence of the specification
of climate change damages on the social cost of carbon. Economics Discussion
Paper, (2011-22), 2011.
[59] D. M. Kreps. A representation theorem for” preference for flexibility”. Economet-
rica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 565–577, 1979.
[60] P. Krusell, B. Kurus¸c¸u, and A. A. Smith. Time orientation and asset prices.
Journal of Monetary Economics, 49(1):107–135, 2002.
[61] P. Krusell, B. Kurus¸c¸u, and A. A. Smith. Temptation and taxation. Econometrica,
78(6):2063–2084, 2010.
[62] D. Laibson. Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 112(2):443–478, 1997.
[63] M. B. Lisboa. Moral hazard and general equilibrium in large economies. Economic
Theory, 18(3):555–575
[64] R. Mendelsohn, W. Morrison, M. E. Schlesinger, and N. G. Andronova. Country-
specific market impacts of climate change. Climatic change, 45(3-4):553–569, 2000.
[65] M. Menegatti and D. Baiardi. Pigouvian tax, abatement policies and uncertainty
on the environment. Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy), Eco-
nomics Department Working Papers, 2010.
[66] J. Miao. Option exercise with temptation. Economic Theory, 34(3):473–501, 2008.
[67] K. Nehring. Self-control through second-order preferences. Unpublished paper,
Department of Economics, University of California, Davis.[130], 2006.
[68] J. Noor. Commitment and self-control. Journal of Economic theory, 135(1):1–34,
2007.
[69] J. Noor. Temptation and revealed preference. Econometrica, 79(2):601–644, 2011.
Bibliography 18
[70] J. Noor and N. Takeoka. Menu-dependent self-control. Boston University - De-
partment of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2011-041, Boston University
- Department of Economics, Jan. 2011.
[71] W. D. Nordhaus. Rolling the ‘dice’: an optimal transition path for controlling
greenhouse gases. Resource and Energy Economics, 15(1):27–50, 1993.
[72] W. D. Nordhaus. A review of the” stern review on the economics of climate
change”. Journal of Economic Literature, pages 686–702, 2007.
[73] W. D. Nordhaus. The economics of tail events with an application to climate
change. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 5(2):240–257, 2011.
[74] W. D. Nordhaus and J. Boyer. Warning the World: Economic Models of Global
Warming. MIT Press (MA), 2000.
[75] T. O’Donoghue and M. Rabin. Doing it now or later. American Economic Review,
pages 103–124, 1999.
[76] T. O’Donoghue and M. Rabin. Choice and procrastination. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 116(1):121–160, 2001.
[77] T. O’Donoghue and M. Rabin. Optimal sin taxes. Journal of Public Economics,
90(10):1825–1849, 2006.
[78] W. Pesendorfer. Financial innovation in a general equilibrium model. Journal of
Economic Theory, 65(1):79–116, 1995.
[79] E. S. Phelps and R. A. Pollak. On second-best national saving and game-
equilibrium growth. The Review of Economic Studies, 35(2):185–199, 1968.
[80] R. S. Pindyck. Fat tails, thin tails, and climate change policy. Review of Environ-
mental Economics and Policy, 5(2):258–274, 2011.
[81] R. S. Pindyck. Uncertain outcomes and climate change policy. Journal of Envi-
ronmental Economics and Management, 63(3):289–303, 2012.
[82] H. M. Polemarchakis and P. Siconolfi. Generic existence of competitive equilibria
with restricted participation. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 28(3):289–311,
1997.
[83] E. C. Prescott and R. M. Townsend. Pareto optima and competitive equilibria with
adverse selection and moral hazard. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric
Society, pages 21–45, 1984.
Bibliography 19
[84] J. Quiggin. Stern and his critics on discounting and climate change: an editorial
essay. Climatic Change, 89(3):195–205, 2008.
[85] S. T. Richard. The damage costs of climate change toward more comprehensive
calculations. Environmental and Resource Economics, 5(4):353–374, 1995.
[86] M. Riddel. Uncertainty and measurement error in welfare models for risk changes.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 61(3):341–354, 2011.
[87] T. Roughgarden and S. H. Schneider. Climate change policy: quantifying un-
certainties for damages and optimal carbon taxes. Energy Policy, 27(7):415–429,
1999.
[88] A. Sandmo. Optimal taxation in the presence of externalities. The Swedish Journal
of Economics, pages 86–98, 1975.
[89] T. Sarver. Anticipating regret: Why fewer options may be better. Econometrica,
76(2):263–305, 2008.
[90] W. D. Shaw and R. T. Woodward. Why environmental and resource economists
should care about non-expected utility models. Resource and Energy Economics,
30(1):66–89, 2008.
[91] N. N. H. Stern. The economics of climate change: the Stern review. Cambridge
University Press, 2007.
[92] J. E. Stiglitz. The inefficiency of the stock market equilibrium. The Review of
Economic Studies, 49(2):241–261, 1982.
[93] J. E. Stovall. Multiple temptations. Econometrica, 78(1):349–376, 2010.
[94] R. H. Strotz. Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility maximization. The
Review of Economic Studies, 23(3):165–180, 1955.
[95] R. Tol. The social cost of carbon: trends, outliers and catastrophes. Economics:
The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, 2, 2008.
[96] R. S. Tol. Estimates of the damage costs of climate change. part 1: Benchmark
estimates. Environmental and Resource Economics, 21(1):47–73, 2002.
[97] R. S. Tol. Is the uncertainty about climate change too large for expected cost-
benefit analysis? Climatic Change, 56(3):265–289, 2003.
[98] R. S. Tol. The economic effects of climate change. The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 23(2):29–51, 2009.
Bibliography 20
[99] Y. Tsur and A. Zemel. Accounting for global warming risks: resource management
under event uncertainty. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 20(6):1289–
1305, 1996.
[100] H.-P. Weikard and X. Zhu. Discounting and environmental quality: When should
dual rates be used? Economic Modelling, 22(5):868–878, 2005.
[101] M. Weitzman. Additive damages, fat-tailed climate dynamics, and uncertain dis-
counting. Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, 3, 2009.
[102] M. L. Weitzman. On modeling and interpreting the economics of catastrophic
climate change. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(1):1–19, 2009.
[103] M. L. Weitzman. What is the” damages function” for global warming—and what
difference might it make? Climate Change Economics, 1(01):57–69, 2010.
